Ali, R. v

A sentencing indication must be expressed so that a defendant can understand the maximum custodial consequence of pleading guilty. Where a Goodyear indication reasonably conveys that a stated term is the maximum sentence, subject only to an identified qualification, a later additional custodial direction may create a legitimate sense of grievance and should be quashed.

Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 240(3), time spent on remand in custody must ordinarily count towards sentence. Departure requires a statutory basis or a conclusion that withholding credit is just in all the circumstances. Neither was established here.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three Class A drug offences and later pleaded guilty to burglary after His Honour Judge Kemp gave a Goodyear indication of no more than 30 months’ imprisonment for that count. The judge imposed 30 months for burglary and concurrent sentences totalling 12 months for the drug offences.

The appellant was on licence from an earlier sentence for aggravated burglary. Under section 116 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the judge directed that he serve six months of the earlier sentence before the new sentences began. The judge also directed that none of 195 days spent on remand should count towards sentence under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

On appeal against sentence, the issues were whether those directions were compatible with the indication and with the statutory requirement to credit remand time.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed both the six-month direction concerning the earlier sentence and the direction withholding credit for 195 days on remand.

2. The judge’s Goodyear indication stated that, on a guilty plea to burglary, the likely sentence would be no more than 30 months. It expressly excluded only whatever sentence might be passed for the drug counts. Although the judge may properly have focused on the counts on the indictment, the appellant could reasonably understand the indication to mean that the maximum custodial term he would serve was 30 months, subject to that stated qualification.

3. The subsequent direction under section 116 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, requiring six months of the earlier sentence to be served before the new sentences, therefore created a legitimate sense of grievance. The additional six months was quashed.

4. Section 240(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 required the 195 days spent on remand in custody to count as time served. The exceptions considered by the court did not justify withholding that credit. In particular, section 240(4A)(1) could not apply because there had been no administrative order returning the appellant to custody. Nor could it be just in the circumstances to deprive him of the statutory entitlement.

5. The same misleading effect of the indication also supported quashing the direction that the remand days should not count towards sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the appeal against sentence and quashed the direction requiring six months of an earlier sentence to be served and the direction withholding remand-time credit.
• Crown Court: His Honour Judge Kemp imposed 30 months’ imprisonment for burglary, concurrent sentences totalling 12 months for drug offences, and made the impugned directions.