Creggy, R v

For the purposes of section 2(1) of the Company Director's Disqualification Act 1986, an indictable offence is committed in connection with a company’s management where it has a relevant factual connection with that management. The offender need not have managed the company or used it personally as the vehicle for the offence.

Assisting the retention of criminal proceeds through a solicitor’s client account had the required connection where the account operated as a private banking facility through which those managing the company dealt with its funds. Director disqualification protects the public from persons liable to abuse the role of director. A seven-year period was proper for serious company-related dishonesty falling below the most serious category.

The appellant, a retired solicitor, pleaded guilty to assisting others to retain criminal property while suspecting it to be the proceeds of crime. The money had been obtained through a share fraud and was channelled through companies, including Pentagon Securities. The appellant’s client account was used to receive and distribute the company’s funds.

The sentencing judge imposed 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended because of the appellant’s serious ill health, and disqualified him from acting as a company director for seven years. The order permitted him temporarily to act in relation to private companies controlling his assets for the purposes of confiscation proceedings.

He appealed only against the disqualification order. The issues were whether the money-laundering offence was committed in connection with the management of a company within section 2(1) of the Company Director's Disqualification Act 1986, and, if so, whether the order and its duration were justified.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentencing judge had power under section 2(1) of the Company Director's Disqualification Act 1986 to make the seven-year disqualification order.

2. Applying R v Goodman [1993] 14 Cr App R(S) 147, the statutory requirement is a relevant factual connection between the indictable offence and the management of a company. It is not confined to offences which breach rules governing company management. Nor need the defendant personally have managed the company or used it as the vehicle for the underlying fraud.

3. That connection existed here. The company was the vehicle through which fraud proceeds were obtained. The appellant made his client account available as a private banking facility for the company, enabling those who managed its affairs to hold and disburse its funds outside a bank. He suspected that the funds were criminal proceeds, and further disbursement required his participation. The offence therefore had a sufficient connection with the company’s financial management.

4. The discretion to disqualify was properly exercised. The protective rationale stated in R v Edwards [1998] 2 Cr App R(S) 213 applied: the appellant’s serious money laundering and his prior New York convictions justified treating him as a person from whom the public required protection in the company-director role.

5. A period above ten years is reserved for the most serious cases. A period between five and ten years is appropriate for serious cases outside that category. This was such a serious case, and seven years was proper. Any difficulty in managing the appellant’s private assets did not make the term excessive; he could seek leave if fresh grounds arose.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appellant’s challenge to the seven-year company director disqualification order.
• Sentencing court: imposed 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended on exceptional medical grounds, and a seven-year disqualification order under section 2(1) of the Company Director's Disqualification Act 1986. The lower-court citation is not stated in the judgment.