Snow, R v

Perverting the course of justice is inherently grave because it undermines the criminal justice system. Sentence should reflect the duration, nature and success of the deception. A deliberate false identity which results in an innocent person being prosecuted and convicted warrants the utmost severity.

Separate acts of perverting the course of justice may properly attract consecutive custodial terms. However, each count must be assessed according to its own gravity. An unsuccessful attempt to give a false name may justify a materially shorter term than a sustained deception which succeeds. The overall sentence must properly reflect the offender’s total criminality.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Birmingham Crown Court to two counts of perverting the course of justice. On the first occasion, he gave police his brother’s details when stopped while driving. The deception continued until his brother was prosecuted and convicted in absence.

On a later occasion, the appellant gave police another person’s details. He was arrested, made full admissions and pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. The sentencing judge imposed consecutive terms of nine months’ imprisonment, totalling 18 months, and disqualified him from driving for 12 months.

The appellant appealed against sentence with the single judge’s leave. The central issue was whether the individual terms, and particularly the sentence for the second and less successful deception, were excessive.

1. The appeal was allowed in part. The nine-month sentence on count 1 was upheld. The nine-month sentence on count 2 was substituted with three months’ imprisonment, producing a total sentence of 12 months.

2. Perverting the course of justice is invariably serious because it strikes at the root of the criminal justice system. Following the seriousness factors noted in R v Mitchell [2003] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 97, the court considered the duration, nature and success of the deception.

3. Count 1 involved a deliberate and sustained lie which resulted in the appellant’s brother being prosecuted and convicted for an offence he had not committed. Immediate custody was unavoidable, and a term of nine months was reasonable. It accorded with the more relevant sentencing comparisons in R v Corcoran [2006] 1 Cr.App.R (S) and R v Johnson [2006] 2 Cr.App.R (S).

4. The offences were separate and therefore required consecutive sentences. Yet count 2 did not have the same aggravating features as count 1. The arresting officer was not deceived by the false name, and the offence was significantly less grave. A three-month term for that count, consecutive to the nine-month term on count 1, properly reflected both the individual conduct and the appellant’s overall criminality.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal only as to count 2. The court substituted three months’ imprisonment for the nine-month term imposed on that count, leaving the count 1 sentence undisturbed.
• Crown Court at Birmingham: On 4 December 2007, following guilty pleas to two counts of perverting the course of justice, imposed consecutive terms of nine months’ imprisonment and a 12-month driving disqualification.