Izegbu & Anor v Law Society of England & Wales

A disciplinary tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over a non-solicitor under Solicitors Act 1974, section 43 only where the statutory employment or remuneration requirements are satisfied. Where the tribunal’s findings show that the person remunerated himself, rather than being remunerated by a solicitor, the jurisdictional condition is not met and the relevant findings must be quashed. A charge based on a knowingly false statement also requires findings that the statement was false, that the person knew it was false, and that the act or default was in relation to the solicitor’s practice. If those matters were not addressed, the charge should be remitted for fresh consideration. A costs order founded on fundamentally flawed disciplinary proceedings may be quashed.

The appellant, a barrister seeking admission as a solicitor, was subject to disciplinary proceedings before the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal. The tribunal found proved allegations that he controlled purported solicitors’ practices, operated clients’ accounts and misled the Law Society. It also found proved that he knowingly made a false statement in an application concerning investigation by a regulatory body.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction under section 43 of the Solicitors Act 1974, because the evidence and findings showed that he was not remunerated by a solicitor. He further argued that the fourth allegation had not been established and was not shown to relate to the solicitor’s practice. The central issues were whether the first three findings fell within section 43 and whether the fourth allegation should be remitted.

1. The appeal was allowed in relation to the first three allegations. Section 43 applied only if the appellant was employed or remunerated by a solicitor in connection with that solicitor’s practice. The tribunal’s findings established that the appellant controlled the practices, provided the capital, owned the relevant lease, controlled the accounts and remunerated himself. The invoices relied upon by the Law Society were sham invoices and did not establish remuneration by Ms Izegbu.

2. Although the tribunal had failed to address the section 43 jurisdictional issue, remission was unnecessary. On the material before the court, no tribunal could properly find that the appellant was remunerated by Ms Izegbu, a solicitor of the Supreme Court. The first three findings were therefore quashed.

3. The fourth allegation required proof that the appellant was subject to an investigation, knew that he was subject to it, and knowingly gave an untrue answer. The tribunal had found awareness of a Law Society investigation but had not determined whether the investigation was into the appellant himself. It had also failed to determine whether the alleged act or default was in relation to the solicitor’s practice. Those questions were remitted for fresh consideration.

4. The costs order made by the tribunal was quashed in full because the prosecution was fundamentally flawed in presenting a case which, if true, fell outside section 43. The appellant was awarded £5,250 plus VAT for the costs of the appeal hearing on which the successful jurisdictional argument was advanced. The section 43 order was to be quashed, and the fourth allegation was to be considered by a freshly constituted tribunal, subject to substantially reduced documentation.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal from findings of the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal dated 1 May 2007. The appeal was allowed in relation to the first three allegations, and the fourth allegation was remitted for further consideration.