Trumm v Norman

In an Internet libel claim, publication is not presumed merely because defamatory words were accessible online. The claimant must prove publication to the relevant reader, by direct evidence or inference from all the circumstances.

The meaning of words is assessed through the hypothetical reasonable reader, who reads them quickly and normally rather than as a lawyer. An allegation of unreasonable behaviour causing serious personal consequences, coupled with an assertion that the claimant is not generally credible, is defamatory.

An allegation that a person supplied a list does not ordinarily convey a breach of confidence without sufficient contextual knowledge. Qualified privilege depends on reciprocal duty or interest and is unavailable for publication to members of the public lacking a material interest in the affairs concerned.

The claimant, a train driver and former member of ASLEF, sued the union’s Acting General Secretary for libel arising from a circular, magazine article and website publication concerning the settlement of earlier litigation and the claimant’s conduct.

Three passages were relied upon. The first alleged that, if the claimant had been innocent and truthful, he would not have faced liability for damages and costs. The second referred to an alleged obsession, the breakdown of his marriage and loss of contact with his children, while implying that he was not generally credible. The third referred to the receipt of a list of names allegedly connected with a website and was said to convey a breach of confidence.

The court had to determine the meanings of the passages, whether publication was protected by qualified privilege, whether publication through the website could be inferred, and the appropriate damages.

1. Meaning. The first passage conveyed that the claimant was guilty of disreputable conduct and had not been truthful. The second conveyed that he was obsessive, that his behaviour had caused the stated personal consequences, and that he was not generally to be believed. Both meanings were defamatory. The reference to obsession concerned unreasonable behaviour, not a medical condition which might attract sympathy rather than lower estimation.
2. The third passage referred to the claimant as the source of the list, but did not ordinarily convey a breach of confidence. Even assuming the pleaded background knowledge, that meaning required an unduly analytical or suspicious approach. A reasonable reader would understand that confidential information may properly be disclosed in contexts such as legal proceedings. The claim based on that passage therefore failed.
3. The reasonable reader is fair-minded and reasonable, but may engage in loose thinking. Meaning is assessed by the impression made on a reader who reads the words quickly and normally, without meticulous legal analysis.
4. There is no legal presumption that defamatory words placed on an Internet website were read by a particular person. Publication may be proved by inference, but whether an inference is drawn depends on all the circumstances. The court inferred readership by ASLEF members but not by non-members, given the website’s specialist character.
5. Qualified privilege protected publication of the first passage to ASLEF members. It did not protect publication to journalists and other readers of Loco Journal who had no material interest in ASLEF beyond that of an ordinary member of the public. No Reynolds defence was raised.
6. In assessing damages, the court considered the gravity and extent of publication, the claimant’s distress and reputational harm, and his own conduct where it had directly provoked the publication. The claimant’s provocative publications did not justify the defendant’s words, but materially reduced the award. Damages of £7,500 were awarded.