Faizovas, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Handcuffing a prisoner receiving hospital treatment does not ordinarily engage Article 3 where it is connected with lawful detention and does not involve force or public exposure beyond what security reasonably requires. The question is fact-sensitive and requires an individual assessment of escape and public-safety risks, viewed alongside the prisoner’s medical condition. Courts should be slow to criticise assessments made by prison officials, but a bare assertion of risk is insufficient. A detailed, individualised assessment may justify restraints even during treatment. An interference with Article 8 may nevertheless be justified under Article 8(2) for crime prevention and the protection of others.

The claimant, a serving prisoner suffering from pancreatic cancer, challenged the use of handcuffs and an escort chain during journeys to hospital and while receiving chemotherapy. He alleged breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The Secretary of State relied on individual escort risk assessments, the claimant’s conviction and prison record, public-safety concerns, and the risk of escape from an insecure public hospital. The central issue was whether the restraints were unjustified and reached the minimum severity required by Article 3, and whether any interference with Article 8 was justified.

1. Article 3. The court applied the approach in Mouisel v France [2004] 38 EHRR 34: whether the minimum threshold is crossed depends on all the circumstances, including duration, physical and mental effects, health, purpose and the need for security. Handcuffing in connection with lawful detention does not normally raise an Article 3 issue where it does not involve excessive force or public exposure.
2. The critical question was whether the risk of escape during hospital visits justified the restraints, including during treatment. Risk assessment is primarily for prison officials, and the court should be slow to criticise it. That deference does not permit a bare assertion of risk. The assessments here were individual rather than the rigid application of a blanket policy, and were supported by the evidence of Ms Stephens, the claimant’s OASys assessment, his offence and prison history, and the circumstances of the hospital visits.
3. The claimant was seriously ill but was not particularly frail or medically contraindicated from using restraints. The case therefore differed materially from Mouisel v France and R (Graham) v Secretary of State for Justice [2007] EWHC Admin 2940. Gorodnichev v Russia (Appeal No. 52058/99) and R (Graham) v Secretary of State for Justice illustrated cases where no real evidential basis for escape risk existed. Here, the justification was detailed and cogent.
4. The Article 3 claim was dismissed. At its highest, the restraints were an overcautious use of handcuffs of the kind discussed in Spinks v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 275, which did not reach the Article 3 threshold.
5. Any interference with Article 8(1) was justified under Article 8(2) as necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The application was dismissed. Detailed assessment of costs was permitted.