Gee, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Lewisham

Under section 184 of the Highways Act 1980, a highway authority must respond within a reasonable time to a request for works forming a lawful vehicle crossing. The statute does not prescribe a particular physical form. Any approved modification to the interface between the highway and footway may suffice, including works that raise the road surface rather than lower the kerb.

The authority must give its response in writing, but need not provide, as part of the section 184 response, a detailed statement of wider traffic-management works or a mechanism for the applicant to challenge those works. The safety of subsequent manoeuvring into a garage is a separate issue. Once a sufficient written response has been given, a mandatory order requiring a further decision is unavailable, although declaratory relief and costs may reflect the earlier failure to respond.

The claimant applied to the defendant local authority under section 184 of the Highways Act 1980 for authority to cross the footway to access his garage. The location was near a junction, and the authority initially withheld approval while traffic-management works were considered.

The claimant sought judicial review and a mandatory order requiring the authority to decide and communicate the application. By the time of the hearing, the authority had altered the road layout and reconstructed the footway to crossover standards. It had also written to the claimant stating that the footway could be used as a legitimate crossover.

The central issues were whether the authority had failed to respond within a reasonable time, whether the later works constituted a sufficient response under section 184, and whether the claimant was entitled to any further mandatory relief.

1. The claim for a mandatory order was dismissed. The claimant had been entitled to a decision when proceedings were issued, but by the hearing he had received a sufficient written response and was not entitled to any further order requiring a decision.

2. Section 184 does not prescribe the particular form of a vehicle crossing. The essential requirement is an approved modification to the interface between the highway and footway which lawfully permits vehicular passage and removes the intrusive ridge that would otherwise make access unlawful or unsafe.

3. The authority was required to respond to the claimant’s request within a reasonable period and to give its consent or other decision in writing. The letter of 10 November 2006, stating that the reconstructed footway could be used as a legitimate crossover, was a sufficient response to the application originally made.

4. Sections 184(5), 184(11) and 184(12) operate together in relation to the authority’s consideration of requested works, health and safety, approval or refusal, and the quotation and payment mechanism. Section 184(12) did not require the authority to provide a detailed written account of the wider traffic-management scheme.

5. The broader traffic-management works and the question whether the claimant could safely manoeuvre his vehicle into the garage were separate matters. They were not part of the application for authority to cross the footway, and the claimant had not challenged the works as unlawful or established any nuisance or real risk arising from them.

6. The claimant was awarded his reasonable costs up to 10 November 2006, reflecting the need to commence proceedings to obtain a response. The defendant was awarded £4,000 for its costs of appearing at the hearing, subject to set-off against the claimant’s costs, and permission to appeal was refused.

The judgment records that Owen J granted permission for judicial review on 6 March 2007 because the authority ought to have responded within a reasonable time. The Administrative Court subsequently dismissed the claim for a mandatory order. Permission to appeal was refused.