Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

Under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, a decision contrary to the development plan may be justified by the cumulative weight of material considerations. No individual consideration, such as the probability of finding a suitable user, is a mandatory precondition to permission.

A decision letter must be read in the context of the preceding inquiry and report. It need not address every evidential detail, provided the reasoning is intelligible, adequate and does not leave substantial doubt that the decision-maker misunderstood the law or failed to consider a material issue. A planning condition is lawful where it is reasonable, enforceable and capable of achieving its stated planning purpose. An imperfect part of the reasoning will not invalidate the decision where a sufficient alternative justification remains.

The claimant, a local landowner and employer, challenged the Secretary of State’s decision to grant planning permission for the retention and reuse of buildings, infrastructure and railway sidings at the former Gascoigne Wood Mine site.

The proposal conflicted with parts of the development plan because it involved employment development in the countryside. The Secretary of State nevertheless considered that the site’s rare rail connections and potential for rail-linked industrial or distribution uses were material considerations of sufficient weight. Permission was subject to condition 7, requiring demolition and restoration if the retained buildings were not used wholly or mainly for rail-related purposes within five years.

The issues were whether the Secretary of State had properly considered financial viability and demand, and whether condition 7 was legally unreasonable or incapable of achieving its purpose.

1. Claim dismissed. There was no basis to quash the Secretary of State’s decision.
2. Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires a decision to accord with the development plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise. All material considerations must be weighed, but the weight given to each is for the planning decision-maker. No single consideration is a necessary precondition to permission.
3. The Secretary of State had not ignored financial viability or demand. Her decision letter accepted that the evidence of need for the buildings was weak and that a user might not be found quickly. Read with the Inspector’s report, however, it also recognised the site’s rare rail quality, significant potential and the possibility that a suitable user might emerge. This was an intelligible and adequate treatment of the issue.
4. The appropriate question was not whether, on the balance of probabilities, a suitable user would be found within five years. The relevant question was whether the material considerations, including the probability of finding a user, were sufficiently weighty to justify departing from the development plan.
5. Condition 7 was not unlawful merely because part of the Inspector’s reasoning about short-term occupation was defective. His separate conclusion that the substantial expenditure required for rail-related use made artificial short-term occupation or a funded nominal use remote was sufficient. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the condition was reasonable, necessary, enforceable and capable of mitigating the planning harm.
6. The condition complied with the requirements identified in Circular 11/95 and with public law. The planning authority could take enforcement action if the buildings were not used as permitted within the specified period.