Weaver, R (on the application of) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust

A registered social landlord may be a hybrid public authority under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 when managing and allocating social rented housing. Relevant factors include its non-profit status, state control and influence, public subsidy, links with local authorities and role in delivering government housing policy. Granting and terminating tenancies form part of the same function.

A legitimate expectation based on general guidance will be enforceable only if the representation is sufficiently clear and the claimant was led to expect the relevant benefit. Guidance requiring all reasonable alternatives to be pursued before using mandatory ground 8 did not require possession proceedings first to be brought under discretionary grounds 10 or 11.

The claimant was an assured tenant of the defendant registered social landlord. The defendant sought possession for substantial rent arrears under ground 8 in schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988, a mandatory ground.

She challenged that decision by judicial review, alleging breach of a legitimate expectation arising from the landlord’s terms and conditions and Housing Corporation guidance. She also relied on articles 8 and 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention. The central preliminary issues were whether the landlord was a public authority under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and was amenable to judicial review.

1. Public authority. LQHT was, for relevant purposes, a public authority under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. An ordinary commercial landlord would not be a public authority merely because it let accommodation. LQHT’s position was materially different because it was a non-profit charity, operated in the social rented housing sector, was subject to substantial state control and influence, received very large social housing grants, and worked alongside local authorities in implementing government housing policy.
2. The absence of relevant statutory powers did not prevent public-authority status. Nor did the contractual nature of the landlord’s relationship with tenants determine the issue. The management and allocation of housing stock were closely related aspects of one function. It would therefore be artificial to treat termination of a tenancy as purely private while treating the grant of a tenancy as public.
3. Judicial review. A function which was public enough to engage section 6(3)(b) was also amenable to judicial review on conventional public law grounds in respect of that function. The conclusion did not make LQHT amenable in relation to every function.
4. Legitimate expectation. The claimant had not shown that she knew of, or had been led to rely on, the alleged representation. The statement that LQHT would comply with Housing Corporation guidance was also too general and qualified to amount to a clear, unambiguous and unqualified public-law promise. The guidance itself allowed judgment as to what alternatives were reasonable.
5. Even assuming an enforceable expectation, there was no breach. The requirement to pursue all reasonable alternatives before using ground 8 did not require possession proceedings first to be brought under grounds 10 or 11. The reasonableness of those alternatives could be assessed by reference to their practical prospects of recovering the debt, together with the preventive and recovery measures taken before proceedings. On the history of repeated substantial defaults, LQHT was entitled to regard grounds 10 and 11 as ineffective alternatives.
6. The Convention arguments and any application for a declaration of incompatibility were left undecided because they arose only on artificial assumptions and the legitimate-expectation claim failed. The claim was dismissed.