Crawford v Crown Prosecution Service

For the purposes of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, harassment is assessed objectively. A course of conduct must comprise at least two incidents sufficiently connected in type and context. The conduct must cross the boundary from behaviour that is merely unattractive or unreasonable to conduct that is oppressive and unacceptable, of a gravity capable of sustaining criminal liability. The surrounding circumstances, including the reasons advanced for the conduct, must be considered. Conduct arising from a dispute about children may nevertheless amount to a criminal offence. The criminal courts retain jurisdiction even where family proceedings or civil remedies are also available.

The appellant was convicted at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court of two offences under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, concerning alleged harassment of his former wife and of a man with whom she had begun a relationship. The Inner London Crown Court dismissed his appeal. Its judgment was treated as the case stated, although the facts and legal questions were inadequately formulated.

The appeal concerned whether the findings established a course of conduct amounting to harassment, whether correspondence, surveillance, following and photography could be considered together, and whether the criminal courts had jurisdiction where the conduct arose from disputes concerning children.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed. Although the Crown Court had wrongly treated the correspondence as harassment, the appellant was rightly convicted because the separate conduct involving observations, following and photography established harassment of both complainants.
2. Applicable test. The statutory test was objective. The conduct had to be assessed by reference to what a reasonable person possessing the same information would think. The court had to distinguish conduct that was merely unattractive or unreasonable from conduct that was oppressive and unacceptable, of a gravity capable of sustaining criminal liability. Context was relevant.
3. Course of conduct. The incidents had to be sufficiently connected in type and context to constitute a course of conduct. The observations, following and photography concerning the former wife were closely connected in type and time and plainly formed one course of conduct. The fewer incidents involving the second complainant were nevertheless sufficiently connected to form a separate course of conduct.
4. Correspondence. The letters to Irwin Mitchell and the later correspondence, texts and e-mails did not amount to harassment. The first letter made serious allegations but was addressed to an appropriate person with a legitimate interest in the firm’s integrity. The subsequent communications were largely responses to conduct initiated by others and, viewed in context, were not unacceptable or oppressive.
5. Surveillance and family disputes. The appellant’s asserted purpose of gathering evidence for family proceedings did not justify the manner in which he acted. Waiting within the grounds of the house, entering it, following the complainants and repeatedly observing them were objectively oppressive and unacceptable. A dispute concerning children does not remove conduct from the criminal law. The criminal courts could determine whether the statutory offence was made out, notwithstanding the availability of family or civil remedies.
6. The reference by the Crown Court to the appellant’s culture was legally irrelevant and offensive, but the findings of fact were not thereby impeached. The appeal proceeded on the findings without regard to that reference.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the appeal by way of case stated from the Inner London Crown Court was dismissed.
• Inner London Crown Court: on 28 September 2006, the appeal from the magistrates’ convictions was dismissed.
• Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court: the appellant was convicted of two offences under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and received a conditional discharge for 18 months.