S, R (on the application of) v Halton Borough Council & Anor

[2008] EWHC 1982 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2008] EWHC 1982 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
21 July 2008
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Public law Parole and release decisions
Keywords
judicial review Parole Board extended sentence foster care reasonable steps adjournment public protection young offender
Outcome
claim dismissed; permission to appeal refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A public authority directed by the Parole Board to investigate a release option must take reasonable steps to explore it. The duty is not absolute and does not require the authority to identify or provide a placement which its assessment finds unsuitable. A Parole Board may decide a case after an adjournment where it has obtained sufficient information to reach a properly informed decision. The statutory question remains whether detention is necessary for public protection. A legally represented claimant who did not seek an adjournment will face particular difficulty challenging the Board for failing to adjourn, although that omission is not invariably conclusive.

Factual background

The claimant, a young person serving an extended sentence for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, challenged the local authority’s investigation of foster care as a possible release option and the Parole Board’s refusal of parole. The Board had adjourned an earlier hearing and directed social services to explore release to foster parents experienced with young offenders, alongside other risk-management enquiries. The local authority investigated the option but concluded that fostering was unsuitable, while the Board later refused release because the risk remained too high. The issues were whether the authority had complied with its direction and whether the Board should have adjourned again before deciding the parole application.

Held

  1. The claim was dismissed against both defendants. Permission to appeal was refused, and the transcript was directed to be expedited where practicable.
  2. The local authority’s obligation arose in domestic public law. It was not an absolute duty and did not arise under article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The relevant obligation was to take reasonable steps to comply with the Parole Board’s direction. The court applied the reasoning in R (K) v Camden and Islington Health Authority [2002] QB 198 and referred to R (H) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 AC 253.
  3. The Board’s direction to explore the possibility of foster care did not establish that foster care was required or that release to the family home had been rejected. It left both options open. The local authority had made a careful assessment, contacted relevant independent fostering agencies and explained why fostering was unsuitable. Having reached that conclusion, it was not required to identify or put forward a placement. Regulation 33 of the Fostering Services Regulations 2002 also meant that unsuitable foster care could not be provided.
  4. The claimant’s challenge to the Board’s failure to adjourn was rejected. Following R (Omur Emiroylu) v Parole Board [2007] EWHC 2007 (Admin), it was very difficult for a legally represented claimant to complain that the Board should have adjourned when no adjournment had been sought. In any event, the Board had already adjourned once, had obtained substantially more material, and had applied its mind to whether it possessed sufficient information.
  5. The governing statutory question was whether detention remained necessary for public protection under section 247(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That decision was for the Parole Board alone. On the evidence, it had done everything required to reach a proper decision, notwithstanding the claimant’s progress.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

This was a first-instance judicial review claim. Permission to bring the claim had been granted on paper by Flaux J. No later appellate decision is stated in the judgment.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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