Rideh v Secretary of State for the Home Department Rev 1

On a modification appeal under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the court must examine whether each obligation remains necessary to prevent or restrict terrorism-related activity. The assessment is obligation-specific and must account for disproportionate effects on the controlled person and family, including effects on mental health. A control order may continue where there is evidence of continuing terrorism-related activity warranting it; persistence in that activity does not itself justify relaxing controls. Necessary restrictions may nevertheless require alleviation where a less intrusive modification would not materially increase risk. The court made interim modifications removing an early-morning reporting call and prior approval for female visitors, while retaining the other challenged restrictions.

Abu Rideh appealed against the Secretary of State’s refusal to modify obligations in his control order. The requested changes concerned telephone reporting, prior approval for visitors, the curfew and internet restrictions at home. The appeals were determined on the assumption that the control order remained justified because of continuing terrorism-related activity.

The evidence addressed Mr Rideh’s worsening mental health, risk of self-harm, and the impact of the order on his wife and children. The central issues were whether the obligations remained necessary under sections 10(3) and 10(5)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and whether particular restrictions had disproportionate effects requiring modification.

1. The appeals were allowed in part. The court directed the removal of the telephone reporting call between 03.00 and 04.00 and removed the requirement for female visitors to obtain prior Home Office approval. The modifications were interim and time-limited pending determination of the related full control-order proceedings.

2. Under sections 10(3) and 10(5)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the court reviews whether the Secretary of State’s conclusion that obligations remain necessary to prevent or restrict terrorism-related activity is flawed. Usefulness or reasonableness alone is insufficient. The court must consider proportionality and examine the individual obligations rather than the order only at a general level. The need for intense scrutiny was recalled from SSHD v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140.

3. A control order is not required to taper merely because the controlled person has persisted in terrorism-related activity. Where continuing activity may warrant the order, persistence does not eliminate controls that remain justified. A different question would arise if activity had ceased and the evidence that it would restart without controls were uncertain.

4. The order and Mr Rideh’s mental condition both caused stress, but mental illness was not a complete or substantial inhibitor of terrorism-related activity. The court therefore upheld the necessity of most obligations. It nevertheless had to alleviate disproportionate effects on Mr Rideh and his family where this could be achieved without significantly increasing risk.

5. The midday and evening reporting calls remained necessary. The early-morning call was also relevant to the curfew, but its removal was justified by its effect on sleep and family anxiety, the lower likelihood of leaving the house during those hours, and the presence of his wife as a modest deterrent. Prior approval for visitors remained justified generally, but its application to female visitors visiting his wife was disproportionate in the circumstances.

6. The evidence did not justify lifting the order under Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicable threshold was high, and available protective measures, including hospitalisation where appropriate, had to be considered. The internet restriction remained necessary because internet access within the home could facilitate terrorism-related activity and the evidence of educational necessity was insufficient.

The judgment describes an earlier modification appeal concerning the same control order, in which the court directed removal of police-station reporting and substituted telephone reporting. That modification was later made permanent by the Secretary of State. The present appeals concerned further refusals to modify the order and resulted in the interim directions recorded above.