Walters & Anor v Smee & Anor

Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the will, the property disposed of, and the claims of potential beneficiaries. The testator must also be free from a mental disorder or delusion which distorts affections, appreciation of right, or assessment of claims upon the estate.

Where medical evidence shows that dementia impaired the testator’s cognitive faculties, incapacity may be established even if the beliefs in question were not conclusions which no rational person could hold. Apparent lucidity when the will is executed does not necessarily establish capacity. A solicitor who knows of deterioration should investigate the reasons for a radical change in testamentary dispositions with appropriate care.

Annie Latimer’s 1998 will left her residuary estate to Alan and Karen Walters, who had cared for her for many years. Her October 2004 will left the estate to Geoffrey and Enid Smee and excluded the Walters.

The Walters challenged the later will, alleging that Mrs Latimer lacked testamentary capacity and did not know or approve its contents. They also advanced a proprietary estoppel claim in the alternative. The central issue was whether dementia had caused Mrs Latimer to form false beliefs about the Walters and thereby prevented her from properly considering their claims upon her bounty.

1. Disposition. The court pronounced against the October 2004 will and in favour of the 1998 will. The proprietary estoppel claim therefore did not arise.
2. Testamentary capacity. Applying the principles in Banks v Goodfellow [1870] LR 5 QB 549, Mrs Latimer had to understand that she was making a will, the extent of the property disposed of, and the persons having claims upon her bounty. No disorder of mind could poison her affections, pervert her sense of right, or cause an insane delusion to influence the will.
3. The evidence established moderate dementia. It showed confusion, forgetfulness, inability to distinguish fact from gossip, and misinterpretation of events. The principal reasons for excluding the Walters were false beliefs that Mr Walters had abused Mrs Latimer, threatened to remove her to a home, and stolen her money. Those beliefs were products of her impaired cognitive faculties and materially influenced the will. The court therefore found that she lacked testamentary capacity.
4. The court doubted that the test in Boughton & Marston v Knight [1873] LR 3 P & D 63, requiring a belief which no person in possession of his senses could hold, governed cases supported by medical evidence explaining cognitive impairment. It held that dementia may significantly undermine proper appreciation of claims upon the estate without necessarily producing an inherently irrational belief. In any event, the evidence satisfied the stricter test.
5. The court criticised the probate practitioner’s failure to investigate the reasons for the change of will more cautiously or to obtain medical assessment, observing that apparent lucidity on the day did not discharge that concern. The submission based on Scammell v Farmer [2008] EWHC 1100 Ch; [2008] W.T.L.R. 1261 was not accepted on its factual premise.
6. Had it been necessary to decide knowledge and approval, the court would have found those elements satisfied, although produced by Mrs Latimer’s misapprehensions. The suggested backdoor route to an undue-influence inquiry was rejected. The court also made alternative findings that the Walters had established promise, reliance and detriment sufficient to support proprietary estoppel, with the residuary estate being the proportionate relief.

Not stated in the judgment. This was a first-instance decision.