Hatton, R (on the application of) v Devon & Cornwall Constabulary

A response under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is effective where it identifies the driver, even if accompanied by an attempted restriction on the use or disclosure of the information. Such a restriction has no legal effect. Where the response identifies the keeper as the driver, a prosecution for failing to provide information under section 172 should not ordinarily be pursued in the alternative to the speeding allegation. Challenges to charging decisions, abuse of process and the appropriateness of a prosecution should normally be dealt with in the magistrates’ court, with judicial review being exceptional.

The claimant sought renewed permission for judicial review of the Chief Constable’s decision to issue informations arising from an alleged speeding offence. He had received a notice under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and replied in writing that he had been driving, while purporting to restrict use of the statement. The Chief Constable nevertheless proceeded with charges for speeding and, in the alternative, failing to identify the driver. Permission had previously been refused by Sullivan J. The central issues were whether the response satisfied section 172 and whether the charging decision should be quashed.

1. Renewed application refused. The claim was effectively dismissed because the ordinary rule is that a decision to prosecute should not be quashed by judicial review. Issues concerning abuse of process, the appropriateness of a charge and the conduct of the prosecution should normally be determined by the magistrates’ court, subject to judicial review or, more usually, case stated if the magistrates err.
2. The claimant’s written response gave the information required by section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. It expressly identified him as the driver at the material time.
3. The attempted qualification that the statement could not be used or disclosed in proceedings was ineffective. Section 12 of the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988 is clear. On a speeding information, a written statement identifying the accused as the driver may be accepted as evidence of that fact.
4. It was therefore manifestly inappropriate to pursue a section 172 charge in the alternative. If the prosecution treated the statement as ineffective and claimed to have no indication of the driver’s identity, it could not establish that the claimant was the driver. The proper course was for the section 172 charge to be dropped and, if pursued, for the matter to proceed on the speeding charge.
5. The court considered the claimant’s concern well-founded and directed that the judgment could be published and brought to the attention of the Chief Constable and the magistrates’ court. The court did not determine whether the claimant had a defence to speeding.

Permission for judicial review had previously been refused by Sullivan J. On renewal, the Administrative Court refused permission and effectively dismissed the claim.