Wheelform Properties Ltd, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government

Judicial review of a planning inspector’s decision is concerned with public law error, not a rehearing of the planning merits. An inspector has considerable latitude in evaluating evidence and deciding the weight to give competing considerations. A reviewing court should not interfere merely because it would have reached a different planning judgment. A mistake of fact constitutes a separate ground of challenge only in narrow circumstances, including where the mistake materially influenced the decision. Earlier planning history and disagreements with the inspector’s factual assessments cannot justify intervention unless the error was legally material.

Wheelform Properties Ltd challenged a planning inspector’s decision concerning a proposed agricultural worker’s dwelling at a pig farm. The challenge arose under Town & Country Planning Act 1990, sections 288 and 289, following refusal of planning permission and service of an enforcement notice.

The claimant alleged errors concerning animal welfare, travel distances, the availability of alternative accommodation, ownership and control of a nearby dwelling, financial viability, and the planning history. The central issue was whether the inspector had made an error of law or other public law error warranting intervention.

1. The court refused permission for the section 289 appeal against the enforcement notice and dismissed the section 288 challenge. The court’s function was limited to identifying public law errors; it was not entitled to re-argue the planning merits.

2. Under section 79 of the Town & Country Planning Act 1990, the inspector considered the matter de novo. Earlier consideration by the local planning authority, including previous permission for a mobile home, was therefore not material to the legality of the inspector’s decision.

3. The inspector was entitled to substantial latitude in making planning judgments based on the evidence, written representations and site inspection. Applying the approach in R (Newsmith Stainless Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 74, a challenge alleging Wednesbury unreasonableness in matters of planning judgment faced a particularly demanding threshold.

4. The weight given to individual considerations was for the inspector. The principle stated in Seddon Properties Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P&CR 26 prevented the court from substituting its own assessment of the evidence or the appropriate weight.

5. A mistake of fact could constitute a separate ground of challenge, but only in narrow circumstances. In accordance with E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044, the claimant had to show that the mistake materially influenced the reasoning, although it need not have been decisive.

6. The alleged errors did not meet that threshold. The inspector had addressed animal welfare, the availability of nearby accommodation, the relationship between the farm and Lake House, and financial viability. Some disagreements concerned matters of planning judgment, while other alleged factual errors were either immaterial or could not be reopened because the inspector recorded an agreement at the inquiry.

7. The Secretary of State was awarded costs, summarily assessed.

The judgment describes the planning application, the local planning authority’s refusal, the subsequent enforcement notice, and the inspector’s decision. No earlier court judgment is stated.