West Midlands International Airport Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

An application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is concerned with the legality of the planning decision, not a rehearing of its merits. Planning judgments attract a broad range of permissible views, and the court should intervene only for legal error, irrationality, failure to consider a material matter, or inadequate reasons. A decision-maker may reject expert evidence and need not address every argument or evidential detail. Planning policy must, however, be properly understood before it is applied. Reasons must enable knowledgeable readers to understand the conclusions reached on the principal controversial issues. A proposed development must be assessed on its own merits, although earlier decisions may provide relevant context.

The claimant, owner and operator of Coventry Airport, challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 a joint decision of the Secretaries of State dismissing its planning appeal and refusing permission for a new passenger terminal capable of handling up to two million passengers annually.

The appeal followed an inquiry into issues including sustainability, public transport, modal-shift targets, the airport’s fallback position, noise, odours, air quality, planning policy and the proposed mitigation package. The claimant alleged numerous errors in the Inspector’s report, said to have infected the Secretaries of State’s decision. The central issue was whether those complaints disclosed an error of law or merely sought to reopen planning judgments.

1. The claim was dismissed. The decision under challenge was that of the Secretaries of State, although the Inspector’s report informed that decision.
2. An application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is not an opportunity to reargue planning merits. The Inspector and Secretaries of State were entitled to make evaluative judgments about public transport accessibility, modal-shift targets, car parking, the fallback position, pollution, noise, odours, airport competition and policy compliance.
3. The decision-makers were entitled to attach limited weight to the proposed Warwick and Leamington Spa shuttle service because its operation depended on an un तयined passenger threshold and other contingencies. They were also entitled to conclude that the proposed modal-shift targets were challenging but unrealistic, that the development was materially larger than the Interim Passenger Facility, and that the proposed public transport package did not provide the step change contemplated by the Local Transport Plan.
4. The Inspector was entitled to treat the airport’s continuing operation with the Interim Passenger Facility and its environmental controls as the realistic fallback. He was also entitled to give limited weight to alleged clawback benefits, to conclude that the proposed development would add materially to existing noise and odour impacts, and to find conflict with relevant development-plan and national policies.
5. The Inspector’s reasons were intelligible and adequate. He was not required to deal expressly with every submission, concession or item of evidence, nor was he required to suggest alterations that might make the proposal acceptable. The absence of a separate discussion of the claimed virtuous circle, or of every detail of the mitigation and parking proposals, did not establish legal error or procedural unfairness.
6. The fact that policy and the earlier Interim Passenger Facility decision were relevant background did not require the same result. The proposed terminal was substantially larger and had to be assessed on its own merits. The Secretaries of State were entitled to agree with the Inspector’s recommendation and dismiss the appeal.

The judgment describes a planning appeal to the Secretaries of State, following a public local inquiry and an Inspector’s report dated 12 January 2007. The Secretaries of State dismissed the appeal and refused planning permission by decision letter dated 14 June 2007. The High Court dismissed the claimant’s statutory challenge.