Bates v Malyon (Rev 1)

A court may resort to the burden of proof only in the exceptional situation where, after examining and evaluating the evidence, it cannot reasonably make a finding on a disputed issue. The court must ordinarily demonstrate that it attempted to resolve the issue and explain why it could not do so. The principle applies to any disputed issue, although genuine uncertainty may be more likely in some cases. A trial judge need not address every evidential point, particularly in a fast-track trial, but must grapple with matters fundamental to the decision. Objective evidence may properly outweigh subjective accounts.

The claimant appealed from the dismissal of his road-traffic claim by Mr Recorder Eyre in the Birmingham County Court on 22 February 2008. The parties agreed that the defendant’s vehicle had collided with the rear of the claimant’s vehicle, but gave conflicting accounts of how the collision occurred.

The claimant argued that the Recorder had failed to make findings of fact and had dismissed the claim merely by relying on the burden of proof. The central issue was whether the Recorder had lawfully resolved the factual dispute by reference to objective evidence, or had improperly resorted to the burden of proof without making findings.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The Recorder had not simply abandoned the fact-finding exercise or relied on the burden of proof without analysis. He considered the competing accounts and was influenced by the concentration of damage to the rear offside of the claimant’s vehicle.
2. The principles in Stephens v Cannon [2005] EWCA Civ 222, as revisited in Verlander v Devon Waste Management [2007] EWCA Civ 835, require resort to the burden of proof only where the court has unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the factual issue by examining and evaluating the evidence. The situation is exceptional in that sense, but it may arise in any type of disputed issue. The burden of proof remains part of the law where the evidence cannot rationally support a finding one way or the other.
3. The Recorder’s reference to the burden of proof was linked to the civil standard of proof. His conclusion that the claimant had not established his account on the balance of probabilities followed from his assessment that the objective damage evidence was more consistent with the defendant’s account. That amounted to a finding against the claimant’s account and necessarily in favour of the defendant’s account.
4. The Recorder was entitled to prefer objective evidence concerning the location of replaced vehicle parts over criticisms of the defendant’s subjective account. The engineer’s diagram did not assist the claimant as expert opinion on the point of impact had not been permitted and, in any event, the diagram’s purpose was unclear.
5. Applying Baird v Thurrock District Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1499, a judge need not address every point in issue, but must grapple with fundamental matters. In a fast-track trial, proportionate reasoning is appropriate. The Recorder had dealt with the fundamental issues and given reasons sufficiently clear to explain why the claim failed.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): The appeal from the Birmingham County Court was dismissed.
• Birmingham County Court: Mr Recorder Eyre dismissed the claimant’s road-traffic claim after concluding that the claimant had not proved his account on the balance of probabilities.