HM Attorney-General v Smith

Deliberately impersonating another person in court proceedings, including for the purpose of swearing an affidavit and obtaining interim relief, constitutes serious interference with the administration of justice and may amount to contempt. Where contempt involves conduct comparable to perjury, imprisonment will normally be appropriate. A non-custodial disposal requires exceptional circumstances. The sentence must nevertheless reflect the full context, including the offender’s motive, personal circumstances, previous character, subsequent conduct and delay before disposal. Significant delay, particularly where the offender has lived for a prolonged period under the threat of imprisonment, may justify imposing a sentence at the bottom of the appropriate custodial range.

The Attorney-General applied for the committal of Michael Smith for contempt arising from events at Willesden County Court. Smith had impersonated a friend when completing an application for an injunction, swearing an affidavit and appearing before a judge. The deception was uncovered when he attended the later hearing with the impersonated person. Permission had been granted on 2 July 2007, and the substantive hearing was adjourned on 19 November 2007 to enable Smith to obtain representation. By the hearing, Smith admitted the contempt. The central issue was therefore the appropriate penalty.

1. Contempt established. Smith deliberately represented himself as another person in court documents, an affidavit and the application for interim relief, intending that the administration of justice might be affected. His admissions meant that liability was no longer in issue.
2. Seriousness and usual penalty. The conduct constituted significant interference with the administration of justice and included conduct which, in the court’s view, amounted to perjury. Imprisonment would normally be imposed for contempt of that nature. A different disposal would be appropriate only in exceptional circumstances.
3. Sentence. The court assessed the appropriate range as three to nine months’ imprisonment. The deception was deliberate and continued over more than one day, but it arose from an attempt to assist a friend and was not wholly preplanned in the sense alleged by the Attorney-General. Smith had an impeccable record, had acknowledged his wrongdoing and had attended the later hearing with the person concerned, thereby allowing the deception to be exposed.
4. The proceedings had remained over him for approximately 21 months, during which he had lived with the risk of imprisonment and suffered significant personal consequences. That delay justified imposing the sentence at the bottom of the range.
5. Smith was committed to prison for three months. The Attorney-General was awarded costs, to be taxed if not agreed, with enforcement requiring leave of the court.

The judgment describes permission being granted on 2 July 2007. The substantive committal application was adjourned on 19 November 2007 so that the defendant could obtain representation. The matter was then determined by the Divisional Court.