Michael, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

Judicial review of a compulsory purchase decision examines whether the decision-maker acted unlawfully, took irrelevant matters into account, failed to consider relevant matters, gave inadequate reasons, or reached a decision no reasonable decision-maker could have reached on the material available at the time.

Where an existing stopping-up order has not been challenged within the statutory period, its validity and the resulting access position may properly be treated as established when assessing whether an alternative redevelopment scheme is feasible. A claimant’s complaints about trespass or other private-law wrongs do not affect the validity of the compulsory purchase decision where they are irrelevant to the statutory decision.

The claimant owned a derelict plot at 212 Great Clowes Street, Salford. The local authority made a compulsory purchase order to enable its acquisition as part of a wider redevelopment scheme. Following a public inquiry, the Inspector accepted that the claimant had an alternative redevelopment proposal but identified unresolved problems concerning lawful access, finance and construction.

The Secretary of State confirmed the order on 1 March 2007, accepting the Inspector’s report and concluding that there was a compelling need for the acquisition in the public interest. The claimant sought judicial review, challenging the decision-making process, the treatment of notification and access issues, the factual material before the Inspector, and matters concerning trespass and human rights.

1. The application was refused. The Secretary of State’s confirmation of the compulsory purchase order was a decision she could reasonably and properly have taken on the material before her, and was not open to challenge.
2. Judicial review was concerned with the legality and rationality of the Secretary of State’s decision, rather than the court’s own view of the facts. The relevant question was whether there had been an error of law, reliance on irrelevant material, failure to take account of relevant material, inadequate reasons, or a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made it.
3. The alternative redevelopment scheme depended upon lawful vehicular access from Cornet Street. The stopping-up order made under section 247 of the Town and Country Planning Act had not been challenged within the statutory six-week period. The Inspector was therefore entitled to regard the claimant’s inability to establish access as a serious and unresolved obstacle. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that there was no viable alternative to the developers’ scheme.
4. The Inspector was also entitled to consider the claimant’s lack of secured finance and contractor evidence. Once the stopping-up order made access effectively unavailable, those matters became largely academic, but they were not unreasonable concerns on the evidence available.
5. The Inspector was justified in finding that the claimant had been aware of the planning application affecting his property. Alleged inaccuracies concerning the property’s history and earlier discussions were matters of detail and had not prejudicially affected the report or decision.
6. Complaints about trespass by the developers were irrelevant to the validity of the Secretary of State’s decision and would have to be pursued by other remedies. The court also indicated, without finally deciding the issue, that any interference with property or private-life rights would almost certainly be proportionate in the circumstances.

The court made no final costs order. Any application for costs was to be made in writing, with notice to the claimant.