Director of Public Prosecutions v Hardy

Conduct that begins as a legitimate inquiry may become harassment through the manner and persistence of its pursuit. Repeated unwanted telephone calls, particularly where the caller indicates knowledge of personal details and intends to continue until the recipient engages, may be capable of amounting to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. At the close of the prosecution case, justices may acquit where no reasonable tribunal could convict. However, the absence of threats, the recipient’s knowledge of the caller’s purpose, and the short duration of the conduct do not necessarily make the conduct reasonable. A prima facie case may exist even though the defendant bears no burden of proof.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the decision of the Gwynedd Justices, who ruled at the close of the prosecution case that there was no case to answer on a charge under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The charge concerned repeated telephone calls made to a business over approximately one and a half hours. The justices concluded that the respondent’s conduct was reasonable in the particular circumstances under section 1(3)(c). The central issue was whether that conclusion was perverse and whether a reasonable bench of justices could have found that there was no case to answer.

The appeal was allowed. The case was remitted to the Gwynedd Justices with a direction that it be heard and tried by a different panel. There was no order for costs.

1. The justices were entitled, at the close of the prosecution case, to decide whether the evidence disclosed a case to answer. The statute neither postpones that decision until evidence is called from the defendant nor imposes a burden of proof on him.
2. Under sections 1 and 7 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, conduct which begins as a legitimate inquiry may become harassment because of the manner in which it is pursued and its persistence. The court focused on the statutory concept of a course of conduct, which may include repeated speech or telephone calls.
3. The evidence showed approximately 95 calls to a small business within one and a half hours. The respondent had used an auto-redial facility, stated that he would continue until the recipient spoke to him, and referred to her home address and date of birth. That evidence was capable of amounting to harassment and made the recipient’s feeling of intimidation unsurprising.
4. The absence of threats, the respondent’s purpose of seeking an explanation about his partner’s unsuccessful job application, the recipient’s awareness of that purpose, and the subsequent amicable conversation did not justify the conclusion that no reasonable tribunal could convict. Those matters were relevant to the statutory defence of reasonable conduct, but the evidence was capable of requiring further explanation from the respondent before that issue could properly be resolved.
5. The requirement that the respondent establish, at least by raising a reasonable doubt, that his perception of the circumstances made the conduct reasonable did not alter the prosecution’s burden of proof. The issue for the court was whether, on the evidence before the justices, there was a prima facie case.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ case-stated appeal from the decision of the Gwynedd Justices and remitted the case for hearing and trial by a different panel.
• Gwynedd Justices: at the close of the prosecution case, ruled that no reasonable tribunal properly directed might convict and dismissed the charge.