Mortell v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

A compulsory purchase order may be confirmed where there is a compelling case in the public interest, the acquisition is reasonably necessary, and the statutory objectives are met. Compulsory acquisition need not be the least intrusive available option. Where the compensation code provides proportionate redress, human rights considerations do not constitute an additional free-standing factor requiring separate assessment.

An inspector has a wide discretion to conduct a compulsory purchase inquiry, subject to fairness and the opportunity to present relevant cases. A non-statutory master plan may be a material consideration in the planning framework where it does not contradict the adopted development plan.

The claimant, a resident whose home was included in the Oldham (Derker Area Phase 1 Regeneration) Compulsory Purchase Order 2006, challenged the Secretary of State’s confirmation of the order. The challenge was brought under section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981.

He alleged that the inspector had acted unfairly and appeared biased during a 13-day inquiry. He also alleged errors of law concerning housing demand, accommodation loss, refurbishment costs, alternative acquisition methods, the planning framework, human rights and the material supplied to the Secretary of State. The central issues were whether the statutory and human rights tests had been properly applied and whether the inquiry and decision-making process was lawful.

1. The claim was dismissed. The court found no error of law or unfairness capable of impugning the inspector’s conclusions or the Secretary of State’s decision.
2. Under section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, compulsory acquisition had to facilitate development, redevelopment or improvement and contribute to the economic, social or environmental well-being of the area. The Secretary of State also had to be satisfied that there was a compelling case in the public interest. The inspector was entitled to conclude that comprehensive intervention was necessary to address housing-market dysfunction and that voluntary acquisition and piecemeal development were inadequate.
3. The acquisition engaged Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol, and the procedure engaged Article 6. However, the compensation code, including rehousing obligations under section 39 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, provided proportionate redress. Following James v U.K. [1986] 8 EHRR 123 and R(Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd) v The Housing Corporation [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2229, compulsory purchase need not be the least intrusive possible measure. The approach in Pascoe v First Secretary of State [2007] 1 W.L.R. 885 was correct.
4. The inspector was entitled to treat the Master Plan as a material part of the Council’s policies. It was not a statutory development plan, but it did not contradict the adopted UDP and had been consulted upon and considered by the Council. Pye v Oxford [2002] EWCA Civ 1116 did not require a different conclusion.
5. The inspector had a wide procedural discretion under rule 15 of the Procedure Rules (SI 1990 No. 512), subject to fairness. Restricting irrelevant or repetitive cross-examination, maintaining the witness order and dealing with lengthy submissions did not establish unfairness or apparent bias. The report adequately addressed the major issues, and the Secretary of State was entitled to rely on it.
6. The court nevertheless expressed the hope and expectation that the Council would use section 39 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 to secure suitable alternative accommodation and proper compensation.

First-instance judicial review claim. No prior appellate decision was stated in the judgment.