Organisation for Promotion of Environmental Needs v London Borough of Tower Hamlets & Anor

[2008] EWHC 3053 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2008] EWHC 3053 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
17 December 2008
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Planning law Judicial review—promptness
Keywords
planning permission tall buildings case officer’s report internal consultation material consideration adequacy of reasons CPR 54.5 promptness delay conservation areas
Outcome
application refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In a planning judicial review, a case officer need not report every internal difference of professional opinion. The report must identify the material planning issues, policies and guidance so that the committee can make its own judgment. An omission may nevertheless be a failure to take account of a material consideration. It will not justify quashing permission where the decision would inevitably have been the same. Reasons for granting permission may be sufficient if they explain that the proposal complies with identified planning policies and guidance. A claim under CPR 54.5 must be brought promptly, even within the three-month longstop. Promptness depends on the circumstances and the prejudice caused by delay.

Factual background

The claimant challenged planning permission granted by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets for a substantial mixed-use development including tall buildings near conservation areas and listed buildings. The renewed application followed a deputy judge’s refusal of permission on two grounds; a third ground concerning consultation was abandoned. The claimant relied on an alleged failure to report an internal conservation officer’s objections, failure to address DEV27.3 and CP48 of the Council’s Interim Planning Guidance, inadequate reasons, and delay. The central issues were whether the committee had been properly informed, whether the reasons were legally adequate, and whether the claim had been issued promptly.

Held

  1. The renewed application was refused. Although the claim was issued within the three-month period in CPR 54.5(1)(b), it was not issued promptly. The claimant knew of the decision in principle, had formulated its complaints within weeks, and had no acceptable explanation for waiting until shortly before the longstop. The interested party had suffered substantial financial and other prejudice.

  2. The case officer’s report fairly presented the principal planning issues, including objections concerning mass, scale, conservation areas and listed buildings. An internal difference of professional planning opinion ordinarily need not be disclosed. The report must identify the relevant planning issues, policies and guidance; it need not conduct a head count of officers’ views. The identity of an internal opinion-holder may exceptionally affect its weight, but that circumstance is rare. The approach in R (Park Pharmacy Trust) v Plymouth City Council and Emeris Coolart was adopted.

  3. The omission of DEV27.3, concerning alternative built forms, arguably failed to bring a material consideration expressly to the committee’s attention. However, the extensive prior discussions, amendments to the scheme and detailed consideration of whether tall buildings were appropriate meant that the decision would have been the same. The omission therefore would not have justified quashing permission.

  4. The reasons were adequate under article 22(1)(a) of the Town & Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995. The notice identified the relevant tall-building policies and stated that the development complied with DEV27. Read with CP48, that sufficiently explained why permission was granted. Separate reference to DEV27.3 and a detailed explanation of compliance were unnecessary.

  5. Time began on issue of the planning permission, not the earlier resolution in principle, applying Burkett v LB Hammersmith & Fulham. Promptness remained a distinct requirement under CPR 54.5(1)(a), assessed by the circumstances and the actual or potential effect of delay on others.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The renewed application followed the deputy judge’s refusal, on the papers, of permission to proceed on the original grounds. The present court refused the renewed application and did not consider the protective costs order application.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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