Pogonowska, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Camden

An appeal from a Valuation Tribunal lies to the High Court only on a question of law. The High Court must not rehear the facts or substitute its own assessment of the evidence. It may intervene where the tribunal fails to address a main point, takes account of an irrelevant matter, disregards a material matter, or reaches a perverse conclusion. A tribunal need not mention every piece of evidence, but its decision must be read fairly and must deal with the principal issues. Where an apparent misreading of evidence could have affected the result, the appropriate course is to allow the appeal and remit the matter for reconsideration.

The claimant appealed against a Valuation Tribunal decision concerning liability for council tax on a dwelling in Camden. The tribunal held that her son had not changed his sole or main residence from the Westminster property to the Camden property and that the claimant remained liable for council tax at the Camden dwelling.

The claimant principally challenged the tribunal's factual assessment. The central issue was whether the tribunal had made an error of law by failing to take account of material evidence, in particular evidence concerning the son's registration on the electoral roll.

1. The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Valuation Tribunal for rehearing. The appeal jurisdiction under Valuation and Community Charge Tribunals Regulations 1989, regulation 32, was confined to questions of law.
2. The court could not conduct a rehearing on the facts or consider documents that had not been before the tribunal. Intervention was justified if the tribunal failed to take account of a material factor, took account of an irrelevant matter, or reached a decision that was perverse. A tribunal was not required to mention every matter or every item of evidence, but it had to deal with the main points raised.
3. Under section 6 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, liability followed the statutory hierarchy. If the son was resident in the Camden dwelling within section 6(2)(e), he would be liable; otherwise the claimant would be liable as owner under section 6(2)(f).
4. The meaning of sole or main residence was a question of fact and degree. The court relied on Williams v Horsham District Council [2004] 3 All England Reports 40, including the approach of asking what a reasonable onlooker, aware of the material facts, would regard as the person's home at the relevant time.
5. The tribunal had treated an Experian check as showing no other link with the Camden address. The check in fact showed that the son had been on the electoral roll from October 2004. That evidence could indicate where he made his home and could have affected the decision, particularly because the period from April 2004 was in issue. The error therefore constituted an error of law, and it could not safely be said that the omission would have made no difference.

This was an appeal from the Valuation Tribunal. The High Court allowed the appeal on a question of law and remitted the matter to the tribunal for rehearing.