Secretary of State for Defence, R (on the application of) v Pensions Appeal Tribunal

A Pensions Appeal Tribunal is a statutory tribunal with no inherent jurisdiction. An appeal must be brought within the primary statutory period, subject only to the prescribed extension. Under the applicable scheme, the claimant had six months from notification of a commencement-date decision, with a possible further twelve months where the conditions for a late appeal were satisfied. After the secondary period expired, the tribunal had no power to entertain the appeal. An administrative letter cannot revive an expired right of appeal, although a later letter which properly notifies a commencement-date decision may create a fresh right of appeal.

The Secretary of State for Defence challenged a decision of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal made on 23 March 2007. The tribunal had allowed Mr Burrows to pursue an appeal concerning the commencement date of his war pension, although the proposed appeal was lodged on 17 October 2006 and the relevant decision had allegedly been notified on 17 February 2005.

The central issues were whether the February 2005 letter contained a commencement-date decision and, if it did, whether the tribunal had power to permit an appeal brought after the six-month primary period and the further twelve-month statutory extension.

1. Appeal allowed. The decision of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal dated 23 March 2007 was quashed.
2. Under section 5A of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal Act 1943, a commencement-date decision must be notified to the claimant, with the ground on which it is made, and an appeal lies on whether the decision was rightly made.
3. Section 8 imposed a six-month time limit beginning with notification of the decision. Section 8(5), implemented by regulation 3 of the Pensions Appeal Tribunals (Late Appeals) Regulations 2001, permitted a further period of up to twelve months where regulation 4 was satisfied. The total possible period was therefore eighteen months.
4. Regulation 4 required the main cause of delay to fall within one of the prescribed circumstances, including serious illness, failure to notify the claimant, or exceptional circumstances making an appeal impracticable, and required the appeal to be brought as soon as reasonably practicable.
5. Assuming that the February 2005 letter contained a commencement-date decision, the primary period expired on 17 August 2005 and the maximum secondary period expired on 17 August 2006. The appeal lodged on 17 October 2006 was out of time.
6. The tribunal, being a creature of statute, had no inherent jurisdiction to extend the statutory limit beyond the prescribed period. It should therefore have refused to allow the appeal to proceed.
7. The later letter of 3 July 2007 properly notified commencement dates and created fresh rights of appeal. Although the earlier administrative letter had wrongly indicated that a right of appeal remained, that error did not confer jurisdiction on the tribunal or revive the expired right.

• Pensions Appeal Tribunal: On 23 March 2007, allowed Mr Burrows to pursue an appeal concerning the commencement date of his war pension.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal was granted by HHJ Hickinbottom on 18 January 2008. The tribunal’s decision was quashed and the appeal allowed.