Mirga v Regional Court In Krakow, Poland

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, passage of time bars extradition only where returning the person would be unjust or oppressive by reason of that passage of time. “Unjust” primarily concerns prejudice to the ability to defend the proceedings. “Oppressive” concerns hardship resulting from changes in the person’s circumstances.

Delay caused by the person’s own flight, concealment of whereabouts or evasion of arrest cannot ordinarily support the statutory bar. Culpable delay by the requesting state is relevant, but it is only one factor. The principal focus is the effect of the passage of time. Significant family, business and social ties in the United Kingdom may be insufficient where the person deliberately fled justice and concealed his whereabouts.

The appellant challenged an extradition order made by District Judge Quentin Purdy at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 9 October 2008. Poland sought his return under three European Arrest Warrants concerning fraud offences committed between 1996 and 1999. The appellant had left Poland knowing that criminal proceedings were outstanding and had not informed either the Polish or United Kingdom authorities of his whereabouts.

He argued that the passage of time, including alleged delay by the Polish authorities in locating him, made extradition oppressive under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The central issue was whether the delay and the appellant’s changed circumstances established oppression within the statutory test.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The extradition order remained effective.

2. Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires the appellant to establish that extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time. The court adopted the distinction drawn in Kakis v the Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779: “unjust” relates primarily to prejudice in conducting the trial, while “oppressive” relates to hardship caused by changes in circumstances during the relevant period.

3. The appellant’s own conduct was central. He left Poland knowing of the criminal proceedings, failed to surrender, and concealed his whereabouts from the Polish authorities and the United Kingdom authorities. Delay attributable to such conduct could not ordinarily be relied upon to establish injustice or oppression, save in exceptional circumstances.

4. The court applied the guidance in Government of Croatia v Spanovic [2007] EWHC 1779 Admin. Even culpable delay by the requesting state does not automatically make extradition unjust or oppressive. The principal focus is the effect of time on the person, rather than a judgment on the requesting state’s investigative performance.

5. The evidence did not establish culpable delay by Poland. Although extradition would cause considerable hardship and disrupt the appellant’s family and business ties in the United Kingdom, those circumstances fell far short of oppression within section 14 because the underlying delay resulted fundamentally from his flight from justice and concealment.

Mr Justice Treacy agreed with Lord Justice Scott Baker.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against the extradition order made by District Judge Quentin Purdy at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 9 October 2008.