Chyba v District Court in Strakonice

A decision consenting to further proceedings against a person already surrendered under the Extradition Act 2003 is not appealable under section 26. The Act’s appeal provisions concern extradition orders and do not extend to consent under section 55(6). Where a genuine Article 3 issue arises, the appropriate remedy may instead be judicial review. The Article 3 threshold requires strong grounds for believing that the person faces a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Prison conditions must be assessed cumulatively, but ordinary hardship and unsubstantiated allegations will not suffice. A Category 1 territory is generally presumed to act in good faith and comply with its international obligations unless specific cogent evidence rebuts that presumption.

The appellant had been surrendered to the Czech Republic under a European Arrest Warrant to serve a sentence for attempted rape. The District Court in Strakonice later sought consent for him to serve a separate three-year sentence for rape. A District Judge consented under section 55(6) of the Extradition Act 2003.

The appellant argued that his prison conditions breached Article 3 of the Convention and that the consent decision should be challenged on appeal. The central issues were whether the High Court had appellate jurisdiction and, if it did, whether the evidence established a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held unanimously that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the District Judge’s consent under section 55(6) of the Extradition Act 2003. Section 26 provides an appeal against an extradition order, subject to specified exceptions. It does not provide an appeal against a later consent decision concerning a person already extradited. Section 34 reinforces that a decision under Part 1 may be questioned only through an appeal provided by that Part.
2. The court noted that, where no statutory appeal exists, judicial review may in appropriate circumstances be available. If the appellant had advanced a real Article 3 claim, the proper course would have been to challenge the consent decision by judicial review, with an application for permission and an extension of time if necessary.
3. De bene esse, the court considered the Article 3 issue. Applying the test stated in R(Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Ullah v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] 2 AC 323, the question was whether there were strong grounds for believing that the appellant faced a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.
4. The allegations concerned diet, overcrowding, exercise, medical treatment and punishment, including solitary confinement. The court considered the evidence cumulatively. The appellant’s proof was unsupported by other material, while the Czech authorities supplied detailed answers concerning medical care, discipline and exercise. The further material showed that the conditions fell far short of the Article 3 threshold. The principles in Kalashnikov v Russia (2006) 36 EHRR 587 did not assist the appellant on these facts.
5. The court accepted that the Czech Republic, as a Category 1 territory and party to relevant international instruments, was presumed to act in good faith and comply with its obligations. That presumption had not been rebutted by specific cogent evidence. The court therefore declined to entertain an out-of-time judicial review application.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the District Judge’s consent under section 55(6) of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court also held, on the merits, that the Article 3 threshold was not approached.