Decidebloom Ltd (t/a Stoneacre Motor Group) v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council

For an offence under section 1 of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, the court must examine the description actually alleged and proved. An unspecific advertisement may apply a trade description to particular goods where the circumstances indicate that the goods are being referred to. Subsequent events cannot ordinarily convert an unspecific advertisement into a specific false description. Price is generally not a trade description under the Act and, on the facts, did not identify the vehicle. There is a material distinction between describing a vehicle as new and as brand new. A conviction cannot stand where the information alleges the latter description but the prosecution proves neither its use nor the allegation as charged.

Decidebloom Limited was convicted by justices sitting at Ashton-under-Lyne of two offences under sections 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, arising from an advertisement for a Fiat Punto and the later supply of a pre-registered vehicle. The justices treated the advertisement as implying that a new vehicle could be purchased at the advertised price and treated the supplied vehicle as having been described as brand new.

The company appealed by case stated. It also sought an extension of time and remission to the justices for amendment of the case. The central issues were whether the advertisement applied a trade description to the vehicle eventually purchased, whether a pre-registered vehicle could be described as new or brand new, and whether the convictions could stand on the evidence and informations.

1. Extension of time. The court granted the short extension required for filing the appellant’s notice. There was no prejudice, and the delay did not justify refusing the appeal.
2. First information. The proposition that an unspecific advertisement can never apply a trade description to specific goods was too wide. Rees v Munday [1974] 1 WLR 1284 demonstrated that the circumstances, including whether only one vehicle answered the description, may show that the description was applied to particular goods. In this case, however, a new Fiat Punto ST Active was displayed and available when the advertisement appeared. The advertisement could not be treated as referring only to the pre-registered vehicle later purchased. The later negotiations did not make the earlier advertisement false. Price was generally outside the statutory concept of trade description and did not identify a particular vehicle on these facts. The first conviction was quashed.
3. Second information. Whether a pre-registered vehicle is falsely described as new is context-sensitive. R v Anderson (Kenneth) [1988] R.T.R. 260 was relevant in recognising that issue as one of fact, having regard to section 3 of the Act. But the information charged the supply of a vehicle described as brand new. The addition of “brand” was material. A pre-registered vehicle could not properly be described as brand new, while it could be arguable on different facts whether it was falsely described merely as new. The prosecution had not proved that the charged description had been applied. The conviction therefore could not be upheld by substituting the uncharged description.
4. The error in the information was material because it affected the way the defence case was conducted. Remission for a further attempt to establish the charge was disproportionate and unnecessary. The justices ought to have acquitted. Both convictions were quashed, and a defendant’s costs order was made under section 16 of the Prosecution of Offences Act.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On a case stated from justices sitting at Ashton-under-Lyne, the court allowed the appeal, refused remission for amendment or rehearing, quashed both convictions and made a defendant’s costs order.