H v Doncaster Youth Court

For a breach of supervision requirements under a detention and training order, the statutory maximum for a return to detention is the remainder of the order still running when the offender is brought before the court and the breach is proved. It is not calculated retrospectively from the date of breach. The court must apply the words Parliament used and cannot rewrite them to avoid inconvenient consequences or perceived practical deficiencies. A narrower construction may be preferred where competing constructions of a criminal statute are available. The remaining power to impose a fine means that breaches occurring near the end of the order are not wholly without sanction.

The claimant, aged 16 when sentenced, received an eight-month detention and training order under the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. After release, the supervision element continued. Following an admitted breach of a supervision requirement, the Youth Panel ordered his return to detention for 42 days under section 104(3)(a).

On an appeal by way of case stated, the claimant argued that “the remainder of the term” meant only the period remaining on the date of the order. The respondent argued that the period should be calculated from the date of breach and then treated as running from the date of the return-to-detention order. The central issue was the proper construction of section 104(3).

1. Appeal allowed. The words “the remainder of the term of the detention and training order” in section 104(3)(a) mean the period remaining to run at the date when the court exercises its power to order detention. They do not mean the period between the date of breach and the expiry of the original order.
2. The statutory language is concerned with the exercise of the sentencing court’s power when the offender is brought before it. “The remainder” therefore refers to the term still outstanding at that time. The respondent’s construction would require wording equivalent to that used in sections 105 and 116, which Parliament had not used in section 104.
3. The practical possibility that an offender might delay proceedings, thereby reducing the available detention period, did not make the claimant’s construction absurd. An unsatisfactory consequence cannot justify rewriting a criminal statute. Nor was the result irrational: the original detention and training order could properly set the limit on custody. A fine remained available under section 104(3)(b), with detention potentially following in default.
4. The court would, if necessary, apply the principle that where a criminal statute admits of two constructions, the narrower construction is generally preferable. The case-stated questions were answered “no, no, yes and no”, respectively, and the appeal was allowed.
5. The court indicated that an order declaring the detention unlawful could not be made in this case-stated appeal. Any such relief would require separate judicial review proceedings, potentially involving a different respondent.

1. Doncaster Youth Court: ordered the claimant’s return to detention for 42 days under section 104(3)(a) of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): on appeal by way of case stated, allowed the appeal and answered the stated questions “no, no, yes and no”.