Cocktails Ltd, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

A planning permission must ordinarily be construed from its own terms, but an application may be incorporated where the permission uses sufficiently clear words to make it part of the permission. A description such as “franchised motor dealership” has an ordinary meaning that may include both vehicle sales and servicing, maintenance and repair. Those activities are not necessarily ancillary to one another merely because vehicle sales are essential to the dealership. Where the permitted use includes independent activities, the use is not confined to the narrower use of selling or displaying motor vehicles for sale.

Cocktails Ltd operated a retail sex shop in premises previously used as a franchised motor dealership. The local planning authority considered enforcement action and the claimant sought a lawful development certificate. A planning inspector rejected the claim. The claimant appealed to the High Court under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The central issue was whether a 1997 planning permission for conversion of an industrial unit into a franchised motor dealership authorised only the sale or display for sale of motor vehicles, or also authorised servicing, maintenance and repair activities.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The planning permission authorised a franchised motor dealership and therefore did not fall within the narrower permitted development use described as the sale or display for sale of motor vehicles.

2. The phrase “franchised motor dealership” was not ambiguous when the permission was read on its own. In ordinary usage it included offering and selling vehicles of the franchised manufacturer, together with servicing, maintenance and repair of that manufacturer’s vehicles.

3. The permission also incorporated the planning application. The wording granting permission “for the development proposed by you in your application” was sufficient to incorporate the application by reference. The application reinforced the construction of the permission, referring to a garage, showroom and workshop and identifying car sales and a car maintenance workshop.

4. The ancillary-use principle does not make every activity at a site ancillary to the principal activity. Servicing, maintenance and repair were independent activities because they could be performed on vehicles not sold by the dealer. The relative proportion of sales and workshop activity could vary without altering the character of the franchised dealership.

5. The inspector therefore made no error of law in concluding that the permission did not authorise the narrower use in Schedule 2, Part 3A of the General Permitted Development Order. Other criticisms of the inspector’s reasoning did not require determination.

6. Secretary of State’s costs were assessed at £5,006.25. Permission to appeal was refused, leaving any further application to the Court of Appeal.

The judgment describes an appeal under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 from a planning inspector’s decision concerning a lawful development certificate. No citation for the inspector’s decision is stated in the judgment.