Wheeler, R (on the application of) v Assistant Commissioner House of the Metropolitan Police

A disciplinary charge must be sufficiently specific to enable the officer to understand the alleged failures and answer them fairly. A tribunal may conclude that an officer should have done what was obviously required, even where superiors failed to impose or perform that standard, but it must avoid hindsight. It must consider what the officer could and should have done in the context of competing duties and available time. A reviewing officer need not give lengthy reasons, but must address the substantial points raised and explain the basis for upholding the original decision. A decision based merely on managerial position, without analysing those matters, is unlawful and may be quashed.

The claimant, a Metropolitan Police Detective Chief Inspector, sought judicial review of an Assistant Commissioner’s decision upholding disciplinary findings and cautions imposed by a Panel. The charges concerned alleged failures to supervise a child protection team and its detective inspector. The claimant argued that the charges were vague and duplicated each other, and that the review decision failed to address his evidence concerning the scope of his responsibilities, the expectations of his superiors, and his competing duties and limited time. The central issue was whether the Assistant Commissioner had lawfully reviewed the Panel’s findings and given adequate reasons.

1. The charges were too vague. They should have identified with reasonable specificity what the claimant was alleged to have done or failed to do. Vagueness constitutes a ground for judicial review where it causes procedural unfairness. Duplicity alone does not justify intervention, although it may bear on fairness and penalty.
2. A disciplinary tribunal may, using its professional knowledge and experience, find that an officer failed to do what he obviously should have done, even where the officer’s superiors were themselves at fault. It must, however, avoid hindsight and must not depart from the standard applied by officers at the relevant time without adequate justification.
3. The Assistant Commissioner’s review could properly have been brief. Nevertheless, the reviewer had to address the substantial points raised by the claimant and explain why the Panel’s decision was fair, justified and appropriate. The reasons instead appeared to treat line responsibility as equivalent to breach of duty.
4. The review also failed to analyse whether the claimant could and should have intervened, having regard to his other responsibilities, lack of administrative support, available time, reporting arrangements and the contemporaneous expectations of his superiors. The reasons were therefore insufficient and consistent with the real issue having been overlooked.
5. The Assistant Commissioner’s decision was quashed. The court did not itself determine the disciplinary merits or direct a rehearing. Whether further review or rehearing should occur was left to the Metropolitan Police Service. There was no order as to costs.

This was a first-instance judicial review of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision dated 1 March 2006, which had upheld the Panel’s disciplinary findings and cautions. The court quashed the Assistant Commissioner’s decision and left any further action to the discretion of the Metropolitan Police Service.