Edwards-Sayer, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

For the purposes of the Prison Rules 1999, “convicted prisoner” refers to a prisoner who has been found guilty or has pleaded guilty, even if sentence has not yet been imposed. The word “conviction” can bear different meanings, and its meaning depends on the statutory context. In this context, the wording of the definition and the distinction between conviction and sentence require the narrower meaning. Administrative instructions may lawfully reflect that construction. Policy concerns about the loss of remand privileges and possible effects on guilty pleas do not justify departing from the natural meaning of the Rules.

The claimant was remanded in custody on charges of dishonesty. After pleading guilty to two sets of charges, but before being sentenced, he was treated within the prison system as a convicted prisoner. He sought judicial review, contending that he remained an unconvicted prisoner until sentence and that the relevant provisions of Prison Service Order 4600 were unlawful.

By the time permission was granted, the claimant had been sentenced, so the claim could not affect him personally. The Divisional Court nevertheless heard it because it raised an important issue of general application: whether a prisoner who has pleaded guilty but is awaiting sentence falls within the definition of “convicted prisoner” in rule 2(1) of the Prison Rules 1999.

1. The claim was dismissed. The court held that a person who has pleaded guilty but has not yet been sentenced is a “convicted prisoner” within rule 2(1) of the Prison Rules 1999. Prison Service Order 4600 was therefore lawful in treating such a person as convicted.
2. The word “conviction” may have a wider meaning, referring to the final disposal of a case by sentence, or a narrower meaning, referring to a finding of guilt or acceptance of a guilty plea. The applicable meaning depends on context. The court rejected any general presumption in favour of either meaning.
3. In the Rules, the narrower meaning was required. The definition refers to a prisoner who has been “convicted or found guilty”. That wording focuses on the ascertainment of guilt rather than final disposal. It also supports treating a guilty plea as ending the presumption of innocence for the purposes of the prison regime.
4. The construction was consistent with the structure of the Rules. The general purpose of the training and treatment of convicted prisoners could apply to prisoners who had pleaded guilty but awaited sentence. The practical operation of the regime, including the absence of sentence planning, did not determine the meaning of the Rules.
5. The description of the claimant as having been “convicted of crime” in the remand documentation did not itself determine his prison status. The operative order was the order remanding him in custody. His status within the prison system had to be determined under the Rules.
6. Policy arguments concerning the loss of remand privileges, possible deterrence of early guilty pleas, punishment by the executive and access to legal advice did not justify a different construction. The claim accordingly failed on its substance, and the court did not need to determine the separate issue of delay.

This was a first-instance decision of the Divisional Court of the Administrative Court. Permission for judicial review had been granted by Collins J, but the judgment does not state a separate citation for that permission decision.