R, R (on the application of) v Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal & Anor

On an appeal on a point of law, the reviewing court must respect a specialist tribunal’s procedural rules and discretionary judgments. It should not subject those rules to critical scrutiny simply because the judge considers that a different procedure would be fairer. Where the rules provide flexibility, the tribunal may admit late evidence or adjourn where fairness requires, but written reports cannot generally be admitted without compliance with the applicable late-evidence rule unless the maker gives oral evidence. Strict time limits may be justified by the tribunal’s specialist composition and the need to determine appeals promptly in the child’s interests.

The claimant challenged decisions made by the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal in her appeal against a statement of special educational needs for her autistic son. The Tribunal refused to admit reports served late, refused an adjournment to obtain further expert evidence, and refused an amendment seeking to identify an independent school. The challenge alleged procedural unfairness and error of law. The central issues were the construction of the Tribunal’s late-evidence rule, the scope of its powers to adjourn and admit evidence, and the proper approach of the Administrative Court to those discretionary decisions.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal had committed no error of law.
2. The Tribunal’s rules were deliberately prescriptive because it did not ordinarily hold directions hearings. They nevertheless provided flexibility through the exceptional late-evidence provisions, the power to adjourn, and the power to receive oral evidence. The court should respect that procedural scheme and should not search for ways around it merely because, in the judge’s view, it might not secure fairness in every conceivable case.
3. Rule 33(2)(b) required evidence to arrive at least five clear working days before the hearing. Reports sent on 3 October for a hearing on 10 October did not satisfy that requirement. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the exceptional conditions in rule 33(3) were not met, since the reports had been available earlier and their exclusion created no serious risk of prejudice to the child.
4. The Tribunal could not admit written reports under rule 34 where no witness was to be called to give oral evidence pursuant to them, except in accordance with rule 33. It could, however, admit oral evidence or adjourn where it could not fairly determine the appeal without doing so. The Tribunal was entitled to refuse a lengthy adjournment for a further, unidentified expert report, having regard to the available dossier, the existing evidence and the importance of avoiding delay in the child’s education.
5. The Tribunal was also entitled to refuse an amendment seeking to identify the Shieling School. The school lacked the approval required by section 347(5) of the Education Act 1996, and there had been no material change in circumstances apart from the change of representation.

The claimant’s costs were subject to public funding assessment. No order for costs was made in favour of the Tribunal.

The judgment records the claimant’s appeal to the Administrative Court from decisions of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal. No separate lower-court citation is stated.