Director of Public Prosecutions v Beaumont & Anor

For the purposes of a football banning order, an offence committed on a journey to or from a football match may be related to football matches without being committed within the periods defined as relevant to a match. Those expressions serve different statutory purposes and must not be treated as synonymous. A failure to make or record an express declaration of relevance does not invalidate a banning order where the court actually considered whether the offence was related to football matches and reached that conclusion. On an appeal against sentence, the Crown Court may itself determine that issue, make the necessary declaration and impose or uphold a banning order.

The respondents pleaded guilty at Selby Magistrates’ Court to offences under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1996 arising from rowdy conduct on a train after a football match. They received fines and three-year football banning orders under the Football Spectators Act 1999.

The Crown Court at York allowed their appeals, holding that the offences were not related to football matches because there was no evidence that they occurred within one hour after the match ended. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated. The issues were whether “related to football matches” imported the time limits in section 1(8) of the Act and whether the absence of an express recorded declaration of relevance invalidated the orders.

1. Appeal allowed. The Crown Court’s order was quashed. The magistrates’ banning orders stood and were effectively revived. The matter was not remitted.
2. The expressions “period relevant to a football match” and “offence related to football matches” are distinct. Section 1(8) and section 1(8A) of the Football Spectators Act 1999 define periods relevant to a match for provisions using that expression. They do not impose the same time limitation on offences committed on a journey to or from a match under paragraph 1(k) of Schedule 1.
3. “Offence related to football matches” therefore bears its ordinary meaning and may cover conduct occurring at a considerable physical or temporal distance from the match. Treating the two statutory expressions as having the same meaning would create redundancy within Schedule 1. The approach was consistent with R v Smith [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 58.
4. Section 7(10)(a) required a declaration of relevance. In the court’s view, such a declaration should ordinarily be made expressly in open court and recorded on the memorandum of conviction. However, failure to do so was not fatal where the magistrates had actually considered whether the offence was related to football matches and had reached an affirmative conclusion. The circumstances and orders provided a sufficient basis for that inference.
5. In any event, the Crown Court could determine the issue for itself on an appeal against sentence. The Crown Court had already found that the statutory conditions were satisfied apart from its erroneous construction of “related to football matches”. No useful purpose would have been served by remitting the case.
6. The court did not determine the unresolved issue whether the period during which the orders had been quashed counted towards their three-year duration. Costs were awarded from public funds, subject to detailed assessment.

• Crown Court at York: On 2 February 2007, allowed the respondents’ appeals against the football banning orders and held that there was no power to make them.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal by case stated, quashed the Crown Court’s order and confirmed that the magistrates’ orders stood.