Nottingham City Council v G & Ors

An order under section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 authorises, but does not require, a local authority to refuse contact. At an early stage of care proceedings, complete suspension of contact with a newborn child is an exceptional measure. It requires extraordinarily compelling reasons, particularly before the statutory threshold has been established. Any authority given to refuse contact remains subject to a continuing duty to review the position and resume contact when it is safe and appropriate. The duration of the order should reflect the circumstances and may properly be limited to the next case management hearing.

These care proceedings concerned a newborn child and his mother, G, and father, C. The court had previously directed a residential assessment of G and the child at the Cassell, with possible participation by C. The assessment broke down after G failed to return and C failed to engage. A serious incident then occurred during supervised contact, involving a physical fight between G and C while the child was present. The local authority sought discharge of the assessment order, transfer of the proceedings to the County Court, and authority to refuse contact between G and the child. The judgment followed an earlier related judicial review decision, R (G) v Nottingham City Council (No 2), [2008] EWHC 400 (Admin). The central issues were whether the assessment should continue and what contact arrangements were required to protect the child.

1. The residential assessment order made under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 was discharged. The assessment had broken down because G had not continued with it, and the court’s findings about the incident during contact meant that the Cassell would not receive her back.
2. The proceedings were transferred back to the County Court. The rationale for their retention in the High Court had disappeared because the related judicial review proceedings were substantially complete and no further Cassell assessment was to take place. The case was no longer sufficiently complex to justify High Court involvement.
3. An order under section 34(4) authorising the local authority to refuse contact between a parent and child is a drastic remedy. Before the threshold under section 31(2) has been established, extraordinarily compelling reasons are required. Complete denial of contact lies at the extremity of the court’s powers.
4. The child’s safety imperatively required an immediate section 34(4) order in light of the serious incident during contact. However, an order lasting until the final hearing would have been too drastic. It was limited to expire at the forthcoming case management conference.
5. Section 34(4) authorises the local authority to refuse contact; it does not forbid contact. The local authority remains under a continuing duty to review the position and permit contact to resume when safe and appropriate. The burden at the next hearing would be on G to demonstrate that supervised contact could safely resume and that she could prioritise the child’s needs.

The judgment describes an earlier transfer of the care proceedings to the High Court following a Court of Appeal decision, and a related judicial review judgment, R (G) v Nottingham City Council (No 2), [2008] EWHC 400 (Admin). This judgment transferred the care proceedings back to the County Court.