Dixon, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Section 288 review is concerned with legality, not with a rehearing of planning merits. The court may intervene where an inspector acts outside statutory powers, fails to comply with relevant requirements, or reaches a legally irrational conclusion, but the jurisdiction must not become a cloak for repeating the merits arguments.

An inspector’s decision letter should be read flexibly, in good faith and as a whole. The duty to give reasons requires attention to the main issues, not every argument or evidential detail. Minor factual or arithmetical inaccuracies will not invalidate a decision unless they materially affect the reasoning or form part of a cumulative pattern undermining confidence in the decision.

The claimant applied under Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to challenge an inspector’s dismissal of an appeal under Section 78 concerning outline permission for affordable housing in the Lake District National Park.

The inspector had concluded that no clearly demonstrated current local housing need existed and that the proposal would harm the character and appearance of the National Park. The claimant alleged failure to apply planning policy, material errors of fact, and failure to address important landscape evidence. The central issue was whether those complaints disclosed an error of law within the limited statutory review jurisdiction.

1. The claim was dismissed. The jurisdiction under Section 288 is supervisory. It does not permit the High Court to reconsider the planning merits or substitute its own evaluation for that of the inspector.
2. The inspector’s decision had to be read in a reasonably flexible manner, in good faith and as a whole. The duty to give reasons extended to the main issues in dispute, but did not require every argument or evidential detail to be recorded and resolved. The court applied that approach to the decision letter, including its treatment of housing need and landscape impact.
3. The inspector had not failed to apply the relevant planning policies. His assessment of the appropriate mix of dwelling types was part of his overall evaluation of competing housing-needs surveys. It did not amount to a decision to disregard policy.
4. The alleged factual errors did not justify quashing the decision. Some minor numerical inaccuracies existed, but they were immaterial and did not affect the fundamentals of the inspector’s conclusion. The court rejected the suggestion that isolated errors automatically became material through accumulation.
5. The inspector was entitled to form his own view on landscape harm after considering the parties’ evidence. His conclusion was clear and lawful, notwithstanding an imprecise summary of the National Park Authority’s position and the fact that the identified housing need might have outweighed the harm if it had been established.
6. Material appearing accidentally after the decision letter, apparently consisting of draft observations, had no standing and should not be relied on in the proceedings.

This was a first-instance application for judicial review under Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The judgment records the inspector’s decision following the planning inquiry, but no appellate history before the Administrative Court.