Goodall v Peak District National Park Authority

An enforcement notice served in accordance with planning legislation is not rendered unenforceable merely because the recipient was unaware of it during the statutory appeal period. Article 6 does not generally require domestic time limits to be extended where the legislation provides a practical and sufficiently lengthy opportunity to appeal. A prosecution for breach of the notice does not itself deprive the defendant of a determination of civil rights where the lost opportunity arose from the statutory time limit and the defendant’s failure to appeal. Any remaining challenge is ordinarily addressed through the common-law abuse of process jurisdiction, in which the authority’s good faith and the defendant’s responsibility for the circumstances are relevant.

The appellant appealed by way of case stated from the Crown Court at Derby, which had dismissed his appeal against conviction by Chesterfield Magistrates’ Court for failing to comply with an enforcement notice under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The notice required him to cease storing motor vehicles on land within the Peak District National Park. It was properly served while he was abroad, and no appeal was lodged before the notice took effect. The Crown Court accepted that he might have had an arguable planning appeal, but rejected his arguments based on Article 6 and abuse of process. The central issues were whether the prosecution deprived him of a fair determination of his civil rights and whether it was oppressive to prosecute after he had been unaware of the notice during the appeal period.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Crown Court had made no error of law. The questions in the case stated were answered accordingly.
2. The enforcement notice concerned the appellant’s civil rights because it affected the use and development of his land. However, the prosecution did not deprive him of a determination of those rights. The lost opportunity arose from the interaction between section 174(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which required an appeal to be lodged by the date on which the notice was to take effect, and the appellant’s failure to appeal.
3. The statutory period was at least 28 days after service and, on the facts, exceeded 35 days. The decision in Cavanilles v Spain 116/1997/900/1112, concerning an extremely short time limit, did not make section 174(3) incompatible with Article 6. The provision did not practically remove access to a court.
4. Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not require section 174(3) to be read differently. The statutory scheme also provided no defence to a prosecution under section 179 merely because the defendant lacked knowledge of a properly served notice. Section 179(7) supplied a defence only in the more restricted circumstances specified there.
5. The appellant’s remaining case was properly analysed as an abuse of process argument. The common-law principles were decisive, and the planning authority’s good faith was a relevant consideration. The appellant had known that enforcement proceedings were contemplated and could reasonably have anticipated service of a replacement notice. His failure to make arrangements during his absence meant that prosecuting him was not oppressive or abusive. There was no order as to costs, but the usual order for legal aid assessment was made.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was dismissed. The court upheld the Crown Court’s rejection of the Article 6 and abuse of process arguments.
• Crown Court at Derby: On 24 June 2005, the court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against his conviction by Chesterfield Magistrates’ Court.
• Chesterfield Magistrates’ Court: The appellant was convicted of failing to comply with an enforcement notice under section 179 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.