Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston

The power to extend the statutory time limit for bringing an employment discrimination claim is a wide judicial discretion, exercised in all the circumstances according to what is just and equitable. No rule requires that power to be exercised either generously or sparingly.

The claimant bears the burden of persuading the employment tribunal to extend time. There is no presumption in favour of an extension. Whether that burden has been discharged is a case-specific question of fact and judgment for the tribunal. An appellate court may intervene only for an error of law or principle, or where the decision is plainly wrong.

A police officer brought disability discrimination proceedings against the Chief Constable, alleging a failure to make reasonable adjustments. The Employment Judge held that her claim was outside the three-month limit but extended time on just and equitable grounds. He found that mental ill-health had caused her to give her solicitors an incorrect date for the relevant decision.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal, presided over by Underhill J, dismissed the employer’s appeal. The employer appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the Employment Judge had wrongly adopted a liberal approach to extension. The central issue was whether the Employment Judge’s language disclosed an error of law which invalidated his exercise of discretion.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Judge was entitled to extend time. His findings that the claimant had given her solicitors an incorrect trigger date because of her mental ill-health were supported by the evidence and were capable of making an extension just and equitable.

2. Per Wall LJ, the discretion under paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 3 to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 is at large. It must be exercised in all the circumstances, subject only to the requirement that the tribunal consider an extension just and equitable. Different judges may properly exercise that discretion differently. Characterising an exercise as liberal or strict does not determine its legality.

3. The claimant bears the burden of persuading the tribunal to extend time, and there is no presumption in favour of an extension. Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434 did not prescribe a generally strict or sparing approach. It emphasised both the width of the tribunal’s discretion and the limited basis for appellate interference.

4. The factors identified in British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336 may provide a useful checklist. They remain fact-specific guidance rather than legal conditions restricting the statutory discretion. The relevant matters here included the reason for the delay, the claimant’s promptness and her steps in obtaining professional advice.

5. The Employment Judge’s reference to a textbook’s description of a liberal approach was unfortunate and loosely expressed, but it had no detectable effect on his factual findings or exercise of discretion. Reading the reasons as a whole, he applied the statutory standard and identified an exceptional circumstance supporting an extension.

6. Longmore LJ agreed and stressed that appeals against an Employment Judge’s discretionary decision should be rare. Sedley LJ agreed that no legal principle dictates how generously or sparingly this particular power must be used. Whether the claimant has displaced the statutory time limit is a question of fact and judgment for the first-instance tribunal.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the employer’s appeal and upheld the extension of time.

2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Underhill J dismissed the employer’s appeal, holding that the Employment Judge’s loose reference to a liberal approach had not affected the proper exercise of discretion.

3. Nottingham Employment Tribunal: The Employment Judge held that the disability discrimination claim was out of time but permitted it to proceed because an extension was just and equitable.