H v East Sussex County Council & Ors

The adequacy of a specialist tribunal’s reasons depends on fairness and context. Summary reasons need not analyse every evidential point or explain every step. They must tell the parties, in broad terms, why they won or lost and permit an appellate court to identify any question of law.

A tribunal may reject expert opinion on the very issue within its own expertise without separately addressing every part of that opinion, provided its decision shows that it considered the competing evidence and explains its conclusion. A statement of special educational needs must specify and quantify all required special educational provision. Support directed to a child’s wider care and wellbeing does not become educational provision merely because it affects the child’s education.

A child with Prader-Willi Syndrome had a statement of special educational needs which named a day special school. Her mother appealed to the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal, seeking a residential placement and a 24-hour or waking-day curriculum. The Tribunal rejected that request, finding that the child’s needs could be met by the day school, additional therapy and support outside school hours.

HHJ Inglis, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in the Administrative Court, dismissed an appeal on points of law and refused permission for a further appeal. The Court of Appeal granted permission because two first-instance authorities appeared to take different approaches to a tribunal’s duty to explain its treatment of expert evidence.

The central issues were whether the Tribunal gave legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the residential-placement evidence and whether it unlawfully relied on unspecified social-services support as part of the child’s educational provision.

1. Appeal dismissed. Waller LJ delivered the leading judgment. Scott Baker and Toulson LJJ agreed.

2. The adequacy of reasons is governed by fairness and must be assessed in the factual and evidential context of the particular case. Judicial observations made about the reasons required in earlier cases should not be converted into universal rules. Under Regulation 36 of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal Regulations 2001, the Tribunal was required to give reasons in summary form. It did not have to provide a comprehensive analysis, spell out every step, or address every conceivable point. Its reasons had to tell the parties in broad terms why they had won or lost and enable an appellate court to determine whether a question of law arose.

3. An appellate court should approach the reasoning of an expert tribunal with appropriate caution. The Tribunal alone determines the facts within its specialist field, and its decision should be respected unless it clearly misdirected itself in law. That caution is particularly important where the disputed evidence consists of opinion upon the very issue which the specialist tribunal must decide. A different position may arise where the tribunal leaves unanswered unchallenged technical evidence outside its own expertise.

4. The Tribunal had considered the educational psychologist’s opinion that only a residential placement could provide the required waking-day curriculum. It had also considered the competing evidence about the day school and support available after school. Its conclusion showed that it rejected the proposition that residential education was necessary. It was unnecessary to address separately every aspect of the psychologist’s opinion. The reasons sufficiently explained that the child’s programme could be delivered at school and at home with support from other agencies.

5. A statement under the Education Act 1996 must specify and quantify in Part 3 all special educational provision required by the child. It cannot leave educational provision to bodies other than the local education authority. The Tribunal did not, however, treat the social-services support as educational provision. Such support concerned care and general wellbeing, although it could affect the child’s ability to benefit from education. The educational provision was therefore not unlawfully left unspecified.

6. Scott Baker LJ emphasised that proceedings concerning a child’s education must be determined expeditiously. Everyone involved must proceed with all due speed because delay may cause the child’s best interests to be overtaken by events.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the Tribunal’s reasons were legally sufficient and that it had not treated the social-services support as unspecified educational provision.
2. Administrative Court: HHJ Inglis, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the mother’s appeal on points of law and refused permission to appeal.
3. Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal: The Tribunal refused the requested amendments requiring a residential placement. It found that an appropriate education could be provided through a day special school, additional therapy and support outside school hours.