AA (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal from an asylum determination, an immigration judge need not make separate findings on every subsidiary fact where the appellant’s core account has been rejected for stated reasons and those findings are unnecessary to the outcome. Reasons are legally adequate if they explain the decisive findings and support the conclusion reached. Fresh evidence is admissible only if it bears on the legality of the decision under appeal. Material that could have been presented below, or that does not establish the alleged error of law, should not be admitted.

The appellant, an Iranian national, appealed against an asylum refusal based on his claim that he had converted from Islam to Christianity and would be persecuted on return because he would evangelise. The first immigration judge dismissed his appeal. On reconsideration, the AIT identified a material error of law concerning the standard of proof and ordered a second-stage reconsideration. Immigration Judge Wiseman then dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged that determination, alleging failures to make essential findings and to give adequate reasons for treating him as an ordinary convert who could safely return. He also sought to amend his grounds and adduce fresh evidence concerning his church activities and his mother’s evidence. The central issues were whether the determination was legally defective and whether the proposed evidence could affect its legality.

1. Appeal dismissed. The immigration judge was not required to make separate findings about whether the appellant had sought to convert Hussein, whether his home had been raided, or whether his father had been arrested. The judge had rejected the core account that the appellant left Iran after a telephone warning, and the subsidiary findings were unnecessary in light of that overall credibility conclusion.
2. The judge was not required to spell out every relevant matter, nor was the failure to address every detail of the interview evidence a legal error. Given the short duration of the appellant’s contact with Christianity and the findings made, there was nothing to suggest that the Iranian authorities would seek him out. The judge therefore did not need to make further findings to establish that negative.
3. The reasons for treating the appellant as an ordinary convert and concluding that he faced no significant risk on return were legally adequate. The nature of his conversion was partly conceded, and the judge had addressed the evidence concerning his likely future conduct. The additional material about the Kensington Temple church did not show that the judge had misunderstood or incompletely recorded Mr Chogani’s evidence, or that a necessary finding had been omitted.
4. The fresh evidence was refused. Some of it pre-dated the decision and could, with due diligence, have been placed before the immigration judge. More fundamentally, the material did not affect the legality of the determination, which was the scope of the Court of Appeal’s concern. The decision under appeal was clearly reasoned and sustainable on the evidence before the immigration judge.

• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: The first immigration judge dismissed the appellant’s asylum appeal. On reconsideration, the AIT identified a material error of law concerning the standard of proof and ordered a second-stage reconsideration.
• Immigration Judge Wiseman: On the second-stage reconsideration, the appeal was dismissed by a determination promulgated on 14 January 2008.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court dismissed the appeal and refused the application to adduce fresh evidence.