HS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A reasons challenge succeeds only where the tribunal’s material reasoning cannot be understood. Reasons need not address every inconsistency or every factor individually if, read with the decision as a whole, they explain why evidence was accepted and why the conclusion followed. A reconsidering tribunal must distinguish inadequate reasons from disagreement with the result; the latter establishes an error of law only if the conclusion is irrational. In sequential asylum claims, an earlier finding does not prevent a later tribunal from accepting different direct evidence. Reconsideration should ordinarily remain within its authorised grounds, and any enlargement is exceptional, although that issue was not necessary to this disposition.

The appellant, an Afghan national, sought asylum and protection under Article 3, relying on her and her husband’s past association with the PDPA and KHaD, and on subsequent threats and harm in Afghanistan. Her Article 8 claim was conceded during the appeal process.

Immigration Judge Martins accepted her account and allowed her appeal. On reconsideration sought by the Secretary of State, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal first found material errors of law concerning both credibility and risk on return, then reheard the case and rejected all claims.

The appeal concerned whether Judge Martins had given legally adequate reasons for her findings and, more generally, the permissible scope of tribunal reconsideration.

Appeal allowed unanimously. Carnwath LJ gave the leading judgment, with which Wilson and Ward LJJ agreed.

1. The first-stage reconsideration tribunal had wrongly identified a material error of law in Immigration Judge Martins’s positive credibility findings. A reasons challenge asks whether the decision enables the reader to understand why material findings were made. It does not entitle an appellate tribunal to require a judge to address every item in the evidential balance. The distinction between inadequate reasons and reasons said to be wrong was central. The latter can found an error of law only if the conclusion is irrational.

2. Read as a whole, Judge Martins’s decision adequately explained her conclusion. She had heard and observed the appellant, assessed her evidence against objective material and the psychologist’s report, accepted the core of the husband’s account, and accepted the expert explanation for apparent inconsistencies. Those reasons were sufficient under the approach in [2005] EWCA Civ 982 and [2002] EWCA Civ 605.

3. The earlier adverse treatment of evidence from the appellant’s daughter in the husband’s appeal did not bind Judge Martins. The appellant had herself given direct evidence before Judge Martins. It was therefore open to her to give that evidence weight and to reach a different conclusion.

4. The court did not need finally to resolve whether the tribunal had been entitled to enlarge reconsideration from the limited ground specified in the order. Its observations were that reconsideration should normally be confined to the authorised grounds and that enlargement should be exceptional. Fairness and efficient case management supported respect for an earlier credibility decision unless it was materially flawed in law or its reasons could not be understood.

5. The court restored Immigration Judge Martins’s decision allowing the appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appellant’s appeal and restored the decision of Immigration Judge Martins.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: At first-stage reconsideration, found material errors of law in the original determination. At the subsequent reconsideration hearing, it rejected the appellant’s claims on all grounds.
• Immigration Judge Martins: Allowed the appellant’s asylum and human-rights appeal after finding her credible and at risk on return.