Williams, R. v

When considering an indeterminate public-protection sentence for a young offender, the court must assess the risk of serious harm in the light of youth, capacity for change and reliable evidence of reform. Youth may reduce both culpability and future risk because development can occur more quickly than for adults.

A sentencing court may reject expert risk assessments, but it should give detailed reasons after addressing the factors on which they are based. It should not give weight to an unproven allegation indirectly through a related school exclusion. A grave firearm offence may justify a lengthy determinate sentence, but it does not alone establish the required significant risk where the mitigating evidence points strongly against dangerousness.

The appellant was 14 when he fired a handgun at a man seated in a car. The first shot misfired and the second injured the victim in the shoulder. He was convicted at the Central Criminal Court before HHJ Paget QC of attempted murder and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life.

At sentence, the judge found the appellant dangerous and imposed detention for public protection with a six-year minimum term. The probation officer and psychologist had both concluded that he did not pose a significant risk of serious harm. Their assessments relied on his youth, lack of previous violence, progress in custody, remorse, family support and susceptibility to peer pressure.

The appellant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. The central issues were whether dangerousness justified an indeterminate sentence and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The detention for public protection was quashed. It was replaced by detention for 12 years under section 91, with time on remand to count.

2. The sentencing judge was entitled to treat the offences as exceptionally grave. A 14-year-old's use of a loaded firearm to attempt to kill another person properly gave rise to serious concern about repetition. The seriousness of the offences could in principle support an indeterminate sentence.

3. However, the judge had not adequately justified rejecting the two professional assessments of risk. A court is not bound by expert reports, but, having sought their assistance, it should give detailed reasons for rejecting their conclusions. The judge selected passages from the psychological report without addressing the factors that led the psychologist to find no dangerousness.

4. The judge also failed to apply the particular principles governing young offenders. Youth is highly material to future risk because young people may mature and reform within a substantially shorter period than adults. The evidence of this appellant's conduct during remand, acceptance of the verdict, remorse and educational progress all pointed towards reform.

5. It was inappropriate to place weight on the school exclusion where its principal basis was an untested allegation which the judge had correctly declined to treat as proved. Taken with the reports and other mitigation, the evidence did not establish the significant risk required by Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 226(1).

6. On length, the court applied the approach in Ford 2006 1 CAR(S) 36. The sentence of 12 years was not manifestly excessive, notwithstanding the appellant's youth and other mitigation, because use of a firearm was a seriously aggravating feature.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal against sentence was granted. The appeal was allowed to the extent that detention for public protection was quashed and replaced with 12 years' detention.
• Central Criminal Court: HHJ Paget QC convicted the appellant of attempted murder and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, found him dangerous, and imposed detention for public protection with a six-year minimum term.