Hambleton, R. v

A conviction is unsafe where a fair-minded and well-informed observer would identify a real possibility that a juror or jury was affected by damaging information outside the evidence. The court must assess the possible effect on the trial as a whole. An improper belief about a co-defendant may prejudice an appellant where it could affect the co-defendant’s credibility or the jury’s deliberations. An acquittal of that co-defendant does not remove that risk. Where the court cannot be confident that the extra-judicial material had no unfair effect, the conviction must be quashed.

The appellant was convicted of burglary at Liverpool Crown Court by a majority of 10 to 2. His co-defendant, Shannon, was acquitted. After the trial, a juror reported information suggesting that another juror had treated one defendant as guilty because a friend knew him and regarded him as a bad person.

An enquiry by the Criminal Cases Review Commission established that a person stood down from the jury had discussed with a serving juror why she knew one of the defendants. A further juror reported that, during the trial, a juror had made a prejudicial assertion in the jury room. It was uncertain whether the assertion concerned the appellant or Shannon.

The central issue was whether that uncertainty nevertheless created a real possibility of bias which rendered the appellant’s conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the burglary conviction because it was impossible not to fear that the jury had been infected by material which it ought not to have received.

2. The applicable inquiry was whether a fair-minded and well-informed observer, knowing the facts established after trial, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. Bias in this context arose if the jury, or a member of it, might have been affected by information outside the evidence which was damaging to the defendant and should not have been considered.

3. The reported assertion that a defendant was guilty because he was known to be a bad person was plainly capable of constituting such improper material. Although the evidence did not establish whether the assertion concerned the appellant or his co-defendant, that uncertainty did not make the appellant’s conviction safe.

4. Shannon had given evidence exculpating the appellant. Improper material which damaged Shannon’s credibility could therefore rebound upon the appellant. Further, a juror’s belief that one defendant had always been a bad person might influence that juror’s contributions to deliberations about both defendants. The co-defendant’s acquittal did not exclude either possibility, and it was unsafe to infer that the juror who understood the remark as referring to the appellant must have favoured his acquittal.

5. The court therefore could not be confident that the effect on the appellant’s trial was fair. It ordered a retrial on the same charge at Liverpool Crown Court, with a fresh indictment to be preferred within two months unless otherwise directed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against the burglary conviction, quashed it, and ordered a retrial.

• Liverpool Crown Court: The appellant had been convicted of burglary by a majority of 10 to 2; his co-defendant was acquitted.