Tilley, R. v

For an offence under section 111A(1B) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, a third party does not dishonestly allow a benefit claimant to omit notification merely by knowing of the change and doing nothing. Where the claimant already knows the relevant circumstances, the prosecution must identify action available to the third party which could have resulted in the claimant giving the required notification. The third party has no independent statutory duty to report the change to the authority, and criminal liability cannot rest on an assumed ability to compel the claimant to comply.

The prosecution appealed against a terminating ruling of the Crown Court at Cambridge. Christopher Tilley faced two counts under section 111A(1B) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, alleging that he dishonestly caused or allowed Nicola Tilley to fail promptly to report that they maintained a common household, affecting her entitlement to income support, housing benefit and council tax benefit.

On agreed facts, the Recorder held that there was no evidence of a positive act by the respondent and terminated the counts. The prosecution contended that knowledge, an ability to prevent the omission and inaction could amount to allowing. The central issue was the meaning of allows in section 111A(1B).

1. Appeal dismissed. The terminating ruling was correct. The court directed the respondent’s acquittal under section 61(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

2. Section 111A(1B) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 creates a third-party offence distinct from the claimant’s primary duty under section 111A(1A) to notify a relevant change. It does not impose on the third party an independent duty to report the change to the authorities. The third party’s secondary obligation is not dishonestly to cause or allow the claimant’s failure.

3. Allows means something less than causes, but its meaning depends on the statutory context. In a case where the claimant already knows the circumstances requiring notification, the prosecution must prove that there was action the third party could appropriately have taken which would have resulted in the claimant discharging the primary duty. Mere knowledge, indirect benefit from non-disclosure, or passive inaction is insufficient.

4. The agreed facts disclosed no such action. Reporting the claimant personally was not what the subsection required. The respondent could seek to persuade her, but could not compel her; nor could the law require him to leave the household where his staying would not amount to aiding and abetting her offence. There was therefore no evidence capable of establishing dishonest allowing.

5. The court also considered Parliamentary material. Where a criminal statute is ambiguous, such material should not be used to enlarge criminal liability. Here, the ministerial statements supported the narrower construction already reached.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The prosecution’s appeal under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was dismissed. The court upheld the terminating ruling and directed an acquittal.

• Crown Court at Cambridge: On agreed facts, the Recorder made a terminating ruling on the construction of section 111A(1B) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.