Ratnasabapathy, R. v

Where expert evidence of autistic spectrum disorder may bear upon the mental element of an offence, the judge should relate the mental requirements of the charge to that evidence. Standard directions followed by a separate summary of the evidence may be inadequate.

A conviction is nevertheless safe if, considering the summing-up as a whole, there is no real doubt that the jury understood what the prosecution had to prove and the relevance of the expert evidence. Counsel’s speeches cannot cure an inadequate judicial direction.

The appellant was convicted at a retrial in the Crown Court at Isleworth of wilful neglect of his infant daughter and of causing her grievous bodily harm with intent. The child had sustained multiple fractures and, following feeding with a pipette, suffered prolonged cardiac arrest and severe permanent brain damage.

The appellant, who died after conviction, appealed through his sister under section 44 A of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The first convictions had been set aside after new evidence indicated that he had autistic spectrum disorder. At the retrial, defence experts said that the condition could impair his recognition of pain, distress and the consequences of his conduct.

The sole permitted ground was whether the summing-up adequately directed the jury on the required state of mind in light of that expert evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The summing-up was deficient. Where the defence evidence raised a real issue about the appellant’s state of mind, the judge should have analysed the mental elements of the offences and connected them expressly to the expert evidence. Standard directions on intent and wilful neglect, followed separately by a summary of the expert evidence, did not provide the preferable tailored direction.
2. The deficiency did not make the convictions unsafe. The appellate question was whether there was a real doubt that the jury had understood both what the prosecution had to prove and the relevance of the defence evidence to those matters. Counsel’s speeches could provide background when assessing the trial, but could not substitute for a full and accurate summing-up.
3. The expert evidence was sufficiently clear to reveal its relevance to the jury. It addressed whether autistic spectrum disorder reduced the appellant’s ability to recognise that his daughter was in pain or distress, needed medical attention, or was being harmed by feeding. It also accepted that his condition did not prevent him from forming an intention, acting appropriately, following advice, seeking assistance, or recognising additional obvious signs of distress.
4. Viewed with the judge’s summary of that evidence, the jury would have understood the mental issues on both counts under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and the Offences against the Person Act 1861. There was therefore no real doubt that they could evaluate the evidence and reach safe verdicts. The convictions stood.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the posthumous appeal against the retrial convictions, holding that the deficiencies in the summing-up did not render them unsafe.
• Crown Court at Isleworth: at the retrial, convicted the appellant of offences contrary to section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
• Earlier appeal: the appellant’s original convictions on the same charges were allowed because of new evidence concerning autistic spectrum disorder.