Tregalles, R. v

A serving police officer is not automatically disqualified from jury service. The question is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would see a real possibility of bias. Where alleged police misconduct is a limited part of the evidence, no relevant police witness is involved, and the juror has no connection with the officers concerned, the juror’s occupation need not make the trial unfair or the conviction unsafe.

A later prosecution is not an abuse of process merely because of an earlier conviction. The protection against a second punishment applies where the proceedings arise from the same or substantially the same facts. Materially different later allegations may provide a distinct and fair basis for prosecution.

The appellant was convicted at Bolton Crown Court of 16 sexual and violent offences committed against his two children when they were young. He received a total sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.

He appealed against conviction on the grounds that a serving police officer had sat, and acted as forewoman, on the jury, and that rape counts concerning his daughter should have been stayed as an abuse of process because he had pleaded guilty to indecent assault on her in 1991. He also appealed against sentence. The central issues were whether the juror created an appearance of bias and whether the later rape allegations arose from the same facts as the earlier prosecution.

1. The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed. The renewed application to extend permission to appeal on the jury point was refused.

2. The applicable apparent-bias test was objective: whether a fair-minded and informed observer would consider there to be a real possibility that the tribunal was biased. Following R v Abdroikov [2008] 1 Cr App R 21 and R v Khan & Others [2008] 2 Cr App R 13, a police juror is not disqualified simply by being a police officer. Any possible partiality must be assessed in its effect on the fairness and outcome of the particular trial.

   There was no contested evidence from police witnesses, and no suggestion of partiality towards the prosecution. The appellant’s allegations of improper police conduct in 1981 and 1991 formed only a limited part of a wider credibility assessment. The juror served in a different division, did not know the officers involved, and could not have been one of them. A fair-minded and informed observer would therefore see no real possibility of bias. The trial remained fair and the convictions were safe.

3. The court applied the principle in Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 and R v Beedie [1997] 2 Cr App R 167. The 2004 allegations of rape were materially different from what the daughter had said, and what the police had reasonably understood, in 1991. The earlier charge of indecent assault therefore did not arise from the same or substantially the same facts as the later rape charges. The later information provided a different basis for prosecution, and neither the earlier proceedings nor the lapse of time made the rape prosecution unfair.

4. The sentences for the penetrative offences and the total term had to be assessed with the associated sexual and violent offending, the appellant’s relevant previous convictions, and the available mitigation. The total sentence of 20 years was not manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeals against conviction and sentence dismissed; renewed application to enlarge permission to appeal on the jury ground refused.
• Crown Court at Bolton: The appellant was convicted after jury trial and sentenced to a total of 20 years’ imprisonment.