Goldsmith, R. v

A conviction under section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 cannot stand where the alleged conduct occurred before the Act came into force. A count which gives an overbroad or inaccurate date is not thereby unsafe if the date is not a material averment and the admitted offending occurred after commencement. On sentence, an appellate court will not interfere where the overall term is not manifestly excessive, having regard to the seriousness of the offending, relevant previous convictions, victim vulnerability and offending while on bail.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Inner London Crown Court to ten offences of dishonestly making a false representation for gain, contrary to section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006. He received a total sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment.

On a renewed application arising from an attempt to appeal against sentence, it became apparent that two counts concerned conduct before the Act came into force. A third count pleaded a period straddling commencement, although the underlying conduct occurred after commencement. The court also considered whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. The court quashed the convictions on counts 7 and 18. Each alleged conduct in May 2006, before the Fraud Act 2006 came into force on 15 January 2007. The Act could not operate retrospectively, so convictions under section 1 for those acts were unsafe.

2. The conviction on count 5 was safe. Although its pleaded period began before commencement, the date in an indictment was not normally a material averment. The evidence showed that the conduct underlying that count occurred in late January or early February 2007, after the Act came into force. The pleaded date created an irregularity but did not invalidate the guilty plea or conviction: Pritchett and Langston [2007] EWCA Crim 586.

3. The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused. The offending was mean and unpleasant. It involved repeated fraud by a person with relevant previous convictions, directed at vulnerable victims whom he expected would not complain. The appellant had also continued offending while on bail. The mitigation arising from the avoidance of witnesses giving evidence about intimate matters was limited. The total sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

4. The sentences on the remaining counts were unaltered.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the conviction appeal in part by quashing counts 7 and 18; upheld count 5 and left the sentences on the remaining counts unaltered.
• Inner London Crown Court: The appellant pleaded guilty to ten counts under section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 and was sentenced to a total of 32 months’ imprisonment.