Monaghan & Ors, R v

For credit under section 240A, the relevant period of bail subject to the required conditions must fall on or after 3 November 2008. Time spent on qualifying tagged bail before that date does not count as statutory credit, even if the bail order continued afterwards.

A pre-commencement period may nevertheless be taken into account as mitigation when sentencing discretion is exercised. Administrative guidance requiring a person already on tagged bail to return physically to court for renewed bail in order to obtain credit after commencement was held to be wrong.

The court considered several applications and appeals concerning credit for periods spent on electronically monitored bail curfew following the commencement of section 240A.

Tyler and Gilbert claimed 95 days after 3 November 2008 and a further 51 days before that date. Monaghan, Naser and K raised related issues. The court also considered HM Court Service guidance which suggested that a pre-existing tagged-bail order had to be varied or replaced after commencement before credit could be given.

The central issue was whether, and to what extent, time on tagged bail before and after 3 November 2008 attracted statutory credit or could instead be reflected in mitigation.

1. The court held that section 240A operated only in respect of a person who was on bail subject to the necessary conditions on or after 3 November 2008. It therefore allowed statutory credit for the 95-day post-commencement period claimed by Tyler and Gilbert, but not for their preceding 51 days.

2. The court rejected the HM Court Service guidance insofar as it required a person already subject to a qualifying tagged-bail curfew to return physically before a court for the bail to be renewed. That requirement was described as wrong. The ruling avoided the need for existing bail orders to be renewed merely to secure credit for the period after commencement.

3. The court agreed that periods of tagged bail which did not qualify for statutory credit could be taken into account as mitigation. It reserved its decision on the discretionary treatment of Tyler and Gilbert’s 51 pre-commencement days.

4. Monaghan’s application for leave to appeal was refused. Naser’s application for an extension of time, and consequently his application for leave to appeal, were refused. K was held entitled to credit for 67 days as of right. The court indicated that his four-year sentence would not otherwise be reduced at that stage, and reserved the issue concerning a further 95 days.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): determined related sentence-credit applications and appeals. It allowed credit for qualifying post-commencement tagged-bail periods, refused Monaghan’s and Naser’s applications, and reserved certain discretionary issues.
• Lower-court proceedings: not stated in the judgment.