Taylor, R. v

For an offence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, an intention merely to wound is insufficient. The prosecution must prove an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, meaning really serious bodily injury.

Where the jury have been misdirected on that essential intent, a conviction cannot be treated as safe unless the remaining evidence enables the appellate court to conclude that the jury would nevertheless have been sure of the requisite intent.

The appellant was convicted on 18 July 2007 of unlawful wounding with intent under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and received imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of three years.

A single judge refused leave on the grounds originally advanced. On renewal, a differently constituted full court granted permission of its own motion because the trial judge had arguably misdirected the jury on the intent required by section 18: [2008] EWCA Crim. 2675.

The Crown accepted the misdirection but contended that the conviction remained safe. The central issue was whether the evidence nevertheless established an intention to cause really serious bodily injury.

Appeal allowed. The court quashed the conviction under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, substituted a conviction under section 20, and imposed three years and six months’ imprisonment, less time on remand.

1. The trial judge had misdirected the jury by stating that an intention to cause a wound was enough for section 18. It was not. The required intent was an intent to cause grievous bodily harm, namely really serious bodily injury. The Crown correctly conceded the error.

2. The court then considered whether the conviction was nevertheless safe. It attached no weight to the absence of an alternative section 20 count or verdict. The defence may reasonably have preferred the case to remain an all-or-nothing section 18 allegation, and the court could not be confident that trial counsel had understood the distinction between the two offences.

3. The medical evidence did not assist on intent. It did not establish the depth of the wound or any internal injury. The knife evidence was also inconclusive because its dimensions had not been measured. The remaining evidence was the complainant’s account. The jury had properly been directed to approach that evidence with caution, and their acquittal on an earlier count demonstrated that they had done so.

4. Even if the complainant’s account could support an intent to cause serious injury, it was equivocal. The court could not conclude that the jury, correctly directed, would have been sure of that intent. The section 18 conviction was therefore unsafe.

5. After the Crown elected not to seek a retrial, the court substituted the section 20 conviction. It imposed a determinate sentence which permitted the appellant’s immediate release.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal, quashed the section 18 conviction under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, substituted a section 20 conviction, and imposed three years and six months’ imprisonment less time on remand.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): A single judge refused leave on the original grounds. On renewal, the full court refused those grounds but granted permission of its own motion on an arguable section 18 misdirection: [2008] EWCA Crim. 2675.
• Trial court: Convicted the appellant on 18 July 2007 of unlawful wounding with intent contrary to section 18 and sentenced him to imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of three years, less time on remand.