Stewart, R v

Where diminished responsibility is based on alcohol dependency syndrome, a jury must not treat the defence as unavailable merely because some alcohol was consumed voluntarily. It must assess broadly whether, at the time of the killing, the defendant’s consumption was fairly the involuntary result of an irresistible craving or compulsion, and whether the syndrome amounted to an abnormality of mind caused by disease which substantially impaired mental responsibility.

Alcohol dependency syndrome may fall within section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 even without discernible brain damage. A diagnosis alone does not establish the defence. The jury must decide the statutory questions on all the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of murder at the Crown Court at Blackfriars after killing a man while both were heavily intoxicated. His defence was diminished responsibility based on severe alcohol dependency syndrome. The psychiatric experts agreed that he was a chronic alcoholic with the syndrome, but disagreed about whether it constituted an abnormality of mind and substantially impaired his responsibility.

The trial judge directed the jury that a critical issue was whether the appellant’s alcohol consumption was totally involuntary. The appellant appealed, principally contending that this direction was inconsistent with the later guidance in Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305.

1. Appeal allowed. The direction effectively made diminished responsibility unavailable if the jury found that any of the appellant’s drinking was voluntary. That was indistinguishable from the misdirection identified in Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305. It wrongly required an all-or-nothing analysis of individual drinks rather than the statutory assessment of the defendant’s condition and responsibility.

2. The conviction was therefore unsafe and was quashed. A retrial was ordered, with directions to be given in accordance with Wood.

3. The court gave further guidance for cases based on alcohol dependency syndrome. Whether or not brain damage is discernible, the syndrome is capable of being a disease or disorder within section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957. But diagnosis of the syndrome does not itself prove an abnormality of mind or substantial impairment.

4. The jury should first decide whether the defendant had an abnormality of mind at the time of the killing. It should consider broadly the nature and severity of the syndrome and whether the drinking was fairly the involuntary result of an irresistible craving or compulsion. If that is proved, the disease or illness question will normally follow. The jury must then decide, in conventional terms, whether mental responsibility was substantially impaired.

5. All the evidence, including expert evidence, must be considered. Relevant matters may include the severity of dependency, reduced ability to control drinking, capacity and duration of abstinence, reasons for drinking heavily, the recent drinking pattern, and the ability to make rational everyday decisions. Voluntary intoxication remains no defence to murder, although extreme intoxication may prevent proof of the necessary intent: R v Sheehan and Moore [1974] 60 CAR 208. The court also indicated that evidence about a defendant’s capacity to choose whether, and how much, to drink was not irrelevant to the statutory issues.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against conviction, quashed the murder conviction and ordered a retrial.
• Crown Court at Blackfriars: The appellant was convicted of murder before His Honour Judge Marron QC and a jury on 16 July 2007.