Gillooley, R. v

Evidence of the fact and timing of a complainant’s disclosure may be admitted under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 114, where it forms part of the narrative needed to present the case fairly and both sides rely upon that history. In such circumstances, it is unnecessary to determine whether section 120 applies.

A direction about a complaint in a case involving substantial delay should make clear that it is not independent evidence proving the alleged abuse. A non-standard direction that permits the jury to consider the complaint when assessing truthfulness will not render a conviction unsafe when read with a full and fair summing-up.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Manchester of ten counts of indecent assault on a male and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. The allegations concerned repeated sexual abuse said to have occurred when the complainant was a child and teenager. The complainant did not report the matter to the police until 2004, after telling his mother; he had previously told his girlfriend in the early 1990s.

On appeal against conviction, the appellant contended that evidence of those disclosures had been wrongly admitted as delayed, rather than recent, complaints. He also challenged the judge’s directions about the disclosure to the complainant’s mother. The central issue was whether the admission and direction rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were safe.

2. The fact and history of the disclosures to the complainant’s mother and girlfriend were properly admitted under section 114 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Defence counsel had agreed to their admission and relied in part upon the history of events. The disclosures formed part of the narrative required to present the case fairly, including how the allegation came to the attention of the police. No application to the judge or leave was required in those circumstances.

3. It was therefore unnecessary to decide whether the requirements of section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, concerning recent complaint, had been satisfied. This was not a recent-complaint case.

4. Although a standard Judicial Studies Board direction on recent complaint was unnecessary, the direction actually given was proper in substance. The judge told the jury that the mother had not witnessed the events and that the disclosure was not independent evidence of the alleged abuse or proof of its truth. The jury could consider it when deciding whether the complainant was truthful.

5. Read in the context of a full and fair summing-up, the direction could not undermine the safety of the convictions. The decisive question remained whether the jury believed the complainant, and nothing before the court cast doubt upon their verdicts.

• Crown Court at Manchester: the appellant was convicted on 6 January 2006 of ten counts of indecent assault on a male and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction and upheld the convictions.